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Abstract  
The	  pragmatist	  philosopher	  Peirce	  insisted	  that	  besides	  deduction	  and	  
induction	  there	  is	  a	  third	  main	  form	  of	  inference,	  abduction,	  which	  is	  
the	   only	   type	   of	   inference	   capable	   of	   producing	   new	   ideas.	   Also	   he	  
defined	  abduction	  as	  a	  stage	  of	  the	  methodological	  process	  in	  science,	  
where	  hypotheses	  are	   formed	   to	  explain	  anomalies.	  Basing	  on	   these	  
seminal	   ideas,	   scholars	   have	   proposed	   modified,	   widened	   or	  
alternative	   definitions	   of	   abduction	   and	   devised	   taxonomies	   of	  
abductive	   inferences.	   Influenced	   by	   Peirce’s	   seminal	   writings	   and	  
subsequent	  treatments	  on	  abduction	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  design	  
scholars	  have	  in	  the	  last	  40	  years	  endeavoured	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  design	  
by	  means	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  abduction.	  The	  first	  treatment	  was	  provided	  
by	   March	   in	   1976.	   He	   viewed	   that	   abduction,	   which	   he	   called	  
“productive	  reasoning”,	  is	  the	  key	  mode	  of	  reasoning	  in	  design.	  He	  also	  
presented	   a	   three-­‐‑step	   cyclic	   design	   process,	   similar	   to	   Peirce’s	  
methodological	   process	   in	   science.	   Among	   the	   many	   other	   later	  
treatments	  of	  design	  abduction,	  Roozenburg’s	  definition	  of	  explanatory	  
and	  innovative	  abduction	  is	  noteworthy.	  However,	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  
related	  literature	  suggests	  that	  research	  into	  abduction	  in	  design	  is	  still	  
in	  an	  undeveloped	  stage.	  This	  research	  shows	  gaps	  in	  coverage,	  lack	  of	  
depth	  and	  diverging	  outcomes.	  By	  focusing	  on	  the	  differences	  between	  
science	   and	   design	   as	   well	   as	   on	   empirical	   knowledge	   of	   different	  
phenomena	  comprising	  design,	  new	  conceptions	  of	  abduction	  in	  design	  
are	  derived.	  Given	  the	  differences	  of	  context,	  abduction	  in	  design	  shows	  
characteristics	   not	   yet	   found	   or	   identified	   in	   science.	   For	   example,	  
abduction	  can	  occur	  in	  connection	  to	  practically	  all	  inference	  types	  in	  
design;	   it	   is	   a	   property	   of	   an	   inference	   besides	   an	   inference	   itself.	   A	  
number	  of	  the	  most	  important	  abductive	  inference	  types	  as	  they	  occur	  
in	  design	  are	  identified	  and	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail.	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1   Introduction  
	  
The	   American	   pragmatist	   philosopher	   C.	   S.	   Peirce	   (1839-­‐‑1914)	  
developed	   understanding	   of	   an	   inference	   type	   he	   called	   abduction	  
throughout	  his	   creative	   research	   career	   lasting	   around	  50	   years.	  He	  
used	   different	   names	   in	   addition	   to	   abduction,	   for	   example,	  
retroduction	   and	   hypothesis,	   for	   this	   inference,	   and	   changed	   his	  
conception	   of	   abduction	   as	   his	   research	   progressed.	   He	   viewed	  
abduction	  as	  a	  type	  of	  inference	  that	  is	  ubiquitously	  used	  in	  everyday	  
life	  by	  humans	  –	  sometimes	  comparing	  abductive	   innate	  tendency	  of	  
humans	   to	   instincts	   by	   animals,	   for	   example,	   to	   chickens	   having	   an	  
innate	   tendency	   of	   finding	   proper	   food	   and	   eating	   (Peirce	   CP	   5.591,	  
1903).	   However,	   it	   is	   the	   role	   of	   abduction	   in	   science	   that	   Peirce’s	  
interest	  was	  especially	  focused	  on.	  Abduction	  was	  conceived	  by	  him	  as	  
the	  type	  of	  inference	  through	  which	  all	  new	  ideas,	  still	  hypothetical,	  are	  
produced	   in	   science.	   It	   starts	   when	   something	   surprising	   has	   been	  
observed,	  requiring	  explanation.	  It	  was	  characterized	  by	  Peirce	  as	  the	  
third	  type	  of	  inference,	  besides	  deduction	  and	  induction.	  	  
	  
Although	  the	  concept	  of	  abduction	  stems	  from	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  19th	  
century,	  it	  was	  only	  in	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  that	  it	  started	  
to	  be	  discussed	  again,	   especially	   in	  philosophy	  of	   science	  but	  also	   in	  
other	  fields.	  This	  discussion	  has	  taken	  different	  directions.	  Based	  on	  the	  
original	  ideas	  of	  Peirce,	  scholars	  have	  proposed	  modified,	  widened	  or	  
alternative	   definitions	   of	   abduction	   and	   devised	   taxonomies	   of	  
abductive	  inferences.	  Also,	  later	  authors	  have	  endeavoured	  to	  reach	  a	  
better	  understanding	  of	  Peirce’s	  original	  ideas.	  Nevertheless,	  Hintikka	  
(1999)	  holds	  the	  problem	  of	  abduction	  as	  the	  most	  important	  question	  
in	  epistemology.	  
	  
Inspired	  by	  treatments	  of	  abduction	  especially	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  
there	  is	  a	  broadening	  interest	  in	  analyzing	  design	  in	  terms	  of	  abduction.	  
However,	  in	  critical	  examination,	  it	  can	  be	  asked	  whether	  this	  work	  has	  
led	  to	  conceptual	  gains	  in	  design	  science	  or	  to	  useful	  advances	  in	  design	  
practice.	  
	  
Why	   has	   the	   progress	   of	   clarifying	   abduction	   in	   design	   been	   slow?	  
Three	  main	  problems	  can	  be	  recognized,	  namely	  lacking	  maturity	  of	  the	  
concept	  of	  abduction	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  the	  differences	  in	  context	  
between	   the	   two	   fields,	   and	   the	   embryonic	   state	   of	   the	   science	   of	  
design.	   As	   different	   authors	   in	   the	   design	   field	   pick	   up	   different	  
conceptions	  of	  abduction	  from	  the	  wider	  literature,	  the	  discussion	  has	  
tended	  to	  be	  fragmented	  and	  has	  hardly	  led	  to	  cumulative	  increase	  in	  
understanding.	  The	  concept	  of	  abduction	   is	  still	  deeply	  embedded	   in	  
specific	   interpretations	   within	   the	   context	   of	   science,	   where	   the	  
	  
	   3	  
question	  is	  about	  suggesting	  a	  cause	  (i.e.	  explanation)	  for	  a	  surprising	  
phenomenon.	  In	  design,	  similarly	  a	  “cause”	  for	  the	  required	  behavior	  is	  
searched,	   but	   design	   may	   comprise	   also	   other	   types	   of	   inferences	  
through	  which	  a	  new	  idea	  can	  emerge.	  Unfortunately,	  there	  has	  been	  
little	  scholarly	  work	  on	  the	  different	  types	  of	  design	  inferences.	  Indeed,	  
many	  theories	  of	  design	  conflate	  types	  and	  chains	  of	  creative	  inferences	  
under	  the	  term	  “synthesis”.	  
	  
Thus	  the	  question	  remains:	  how	  do	  new	  ideas	  emerge	  in	  design,	  and	  
how,	  if	  at	  all,	  abduction	  can	  help	  in	  analyzing	  these	  processes?	  In	  view	  
of	  this,	  this	  paper	  attempts	  to	  clarify	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  abduction	  in	  
design.	  The	  main	  starting	  point	  is	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  abduction,	  as	  it	  
has	  been	  discussed	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  carries	  implicit	  contextual	  
assumptions,	  which	  are	  not	  compatible	  with	  the	  context	  of	  design.	  We	  
contend	   that	   the	   focus	   should	   be	   directed,	   besides	   the	   concept	   of	  
abduction,	   to	   the	   underlying	   phenomena	   and	   their	   context	   as	   they	  
occur	  in	  design.	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  define	  and	  characterise	  
abductive	  inferences	  in	  design.	  
 
The	  paper	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  an	  overview	  on	  
the	  prior	  research	  on	  abduction	   is	  given.	   It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   the	  
conceptions	  of	  abduction	  have	  developed	  over	  time,	  and	  are	  about	  to	  
be	  developed	  further.	  We	  aim	  at	  giving	  a	  short	  picture	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  
interpretations	   on	   abduction.	   Then,	   a	   survey	   of	   prior	   research	   on	  
abduction	  in	  design	  is	  presented	  as	  well	  as	  a	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  it.	  In	  
the	  following	  section,	  the	  newly-­‐‑developed	  understanding	  of	  abduction	  
in	   design	   is	   presented,	   and	   a	   number	   of	   main	   types	   of	   abductive	  
inferences	  in	  design	  are	  introduced.	  A	  section	  on	  conclusions,	  including	  
further	  research	  needs,	  completes	  the	  paper.	  
2   Abduction  in  philosophy  of  science  
2.1   Origin  of  the  concept  of  abduction:  Peirce  
	  
Throughout	   his	   career	   Peirce	   insisted	   that	   besides	   deduction	   and	  
induction	   there	   is	   a	   third	  main	   form	  of	   inference	   (see	   e.g.	   Peirce	  W	  
1:180,	   1865;	   CP	   8:385-­‐‑388,	   1913).	   But	   there	   were	   changes	   in	   his	  
notions	   and	   formulations	   of	   abduction	   over	   the	   years	   while	   he	  
interpreted	   it	   in	   relationship	   to	   various	   questions	   concerning	  
reasoning,	   inquiry	   and	   human	   cognition	   (Paavola	   2012,	   46-­‐‑47).	   It	   is	  
customary	   to	   discern	   two	   main	   phases	   in	   Peirce’s	   treatment	   of	  
abduction	  (Fann	  1970).	  In	  his	  early	  works	  Peirce	  defined	  abduction	  as	  
an	   evidencing	   process	   by	   using	   syllogistic	   formulations.	   Typical	  
examples	  of	  abduction	  and	  induction	  can	  be	  formulated	  by	  inverting	  a	  
deductive	  syllogism	  in	  two	  different	  ways.	  Abduction	  is	  an	  inference	  of	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a	  cause	  from	  its	  effects	  (W	  1:180,	  1865),	  or	  “reasoning	  from	  consequent	  
to	  antecedent	  (CP	  5.276,	  1868),	  or	  “making	  an	  hypothesis”	  (CP	  2.623,	  
1878).	   This	   is	   different	   than	   induction,	   which	   is	   typically	   about	  
generalising	  and	  inferring	  a	  rule	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  cases	  (CP	  2.622-­‐‑624,	  
1878).	  In	  these	  early	  formulations,	  the	  strength	  of	  abductive	  arguments	  
was	   presented	   quite	   vaguely.	   Peirce	   said	   that	   abduction	   (or	  
‘hypothesis’	   as	   he	   then	   called	   it)	   is	   a	   “weak	   kind	   of	   argument”,	   and	  
about	   surmising	   (CP	   2.625,	   1878),	   but	   in	   his	   early	   works	   he	   often	  
presented	  it	  also	  as	  a	  form	  of	  probable	  reasoning	  (e.g.	  CP	  2.511,	  1867).	  	  
	  
In	   his	   later	   works	   Peirce	   emphasised	   abduction	   as	   a	   part	   of	   a	  
methodological	  process	  (Fann	  1970).	  A	  basic	  formulation	  on	  abduction	  
is	  often	  cited	  (see	  Peirce,	  CP	  5.189;	  Hanson	  1958,	  86):	  
	  
The	  surprising	  fact,	  C,	  is	  observed;	  
	  	  But	  if	  A	  [an	  explanatory	  hypothesis]	  were	  true,	  C	  would	  be	  a	  matter	  
of	  course,	  
	  	  Hence,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  suspect	  that	  A	  is	  true.	  
	  
Here	  abduction	  is	  a	  part	  of	  a	  process	  of	  inquiry	  and	  central	  in	  that	  stage	  
where	  hypotheses	  are	  invented	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  anomalies	  or	  clues	  (“the	  
surprising	  fact”).	  Abduction	  provides	  only	  tentative	  conclusions	  (“there	  
is	   reason	   to	   suspect”).	   Besides	   abduction,	   the	   process	   of	   inquiry	  
essentially	  needs	  deduction	  (which	  is	  important	  when	  hypotheses	  are	  
explicated)	   and	   induction	   (which	   is	   central	   for	   testing	   these	  
hypotheses).	  These	  three	  (abduction,	  deduction,	  induction)	  provide	  the	  
basic	  phases	  of	   the	  process	  of	   inquiry	  (CP	  6.469-­‐‑473,	  1908),	  and	  the	  
role	   of	   induction	   is	   then	   different	   compared	   to	   Peirce’s	   early	  
formulations	  (this	  difference	  will	  be	  further	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.3).	  	  
	  
Peirce	  emphasised	  in	  his	  later	  works	  more	  the	  weakness	  of	  abduction:	  
“Deduction	   proves	   that	   something	   must	   be;	   Induction	   shows	   that	  
something	   actually	   is	   operative;	   Abduction	   merely	   suggests	   that	  
something	  may	   be”	   (CP	   5.171,	   1903).	   Peirce	   also	   insisted	   now	   that	  
human	   beings	   must	   have	   a	   guessing	   instinct	   for	   finding	   fertile	  
hypotheses	   (CP	   7.220,	   1901).	   In	   his	   early	   formulations	   Peirce	   had	  
rejected	   the	   connection	   of	   abduction	   (or	   reasoning	   in	   general)	   to	  
instinct	  (CP	  2.749-­‐‑754,	  1883),	  but	  in	  his	  later	  works	  a	  guessing	  instinct	  
is	   precisely	   the	   root	   of	   abduction	   (CP	   8.234,	   c.	   1910),	   perhaps	  
somewhat	  paradoxically,	  because	  he	  emphasised	  now	  that	  abduction	  is	  
a	   weak	   form	   of	   inference.	   Peirce	   had,	   however,	   different	   kinds	   of	  
formulations	  on	  abduction,	  maintaining,	  for	  example,	  that	  it	  is	  close	  to	  
perceptual	   judgment	   and	   an	   “act	   of	   insight”	   (CP	   5.181,	   1903),	   an	  
“inference	  through	  an	  icon”	  (Peirce	  CP	  2.96,	  c.	  1902),	  or	  a	  first	  starting	  
of	  a	  hypothesis	  as	  a	  simple	  interrogation	  (Peirce	  CP	  6.524,	  1901).	  One	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central	  feature	  of	  abduction	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  way	  of	  arranging	  facts	  in	  a	  new	  
way	  (Peirce,	  PPM	  282-­‐‑283,	  1903):	  
	  
A	  mass	  of	  facts	  is	  before	  us.	  We	  go	  through	  them.	  We	  examine	  them.	  
We	  find	  them	  a	  confused	  snarl,	  an	  impenetrable	  jungle.	  We	  are	  unable	  
to	  hold	  them	  in	  our	  minds.	  We	  endeavor	  to	  set	  them	  down	  upon	  paper;	  
but	   they	   seem	   so	   multiplex	   intricate	   that	   we	   can	   neither	   satisfy	  
ourselves	  that	  what	  we	  have	  set	  down	  represents	  the	  facts,	  nor	  can	  
we	  get	  any	  clear	  idea	  of	  what	  it	  is	  that	  we	  have	  set	  down.	  But	  suddenly,	  
while	  we	  are	  poring	  over	  our	  digest	  of	  the	  facts	  and	  are	  endeavoring	  
to	   set	   them	   into	   order,	   it	   occurs	   to	   us	   that	   if	   we	   were	   to	   assume	  
something	  to	  be	  true	  that	  we	  do	  not	  know	  to	  be	  true,	  these	  facts	  would	  
arrange	  themselves	  luminously.	  That	  is	  abduction.	  
	  
There	  are	  many	  predecessors	  and	  earlier,	  close	  formulations	  to	  Peirce’s	  
conception	   of	   abduction	   (see	   Paavola	   2012,	   21-­‐‑22).	   Peirce	   himself	  
referred	   to	   earlier	  writers	  who	   had	  used	   the	   term	   “hypothesis”	   in	   a	  
sense	   of	   “the	   conclusion	   of	   an	   argument	   from	   consequence	   and	  
consequent	   to	   antecedent”	   (see	   EP	   1:34-­‐‑35,	   note,	   1868).	   Clear	  
influences	  were	  also	  Aristotelean	  syllogisms	  and	  Kantian	  philosophy.	  
Especially	   in	   his	   early	   lectures	   Peirce	   also	   analysed	   the	   “logic	   of	  
science”	   by	   his	   contemporaries	   like	   Whewell,	   Mill	   and	   Comte	   (see	  
Peirce	  W	  1:	  205-­‐‑223,	  1865).	  Peirce	  appreciated	  especially	  Whewell’s	  
work	  (W	  1:211,	  1865)	  and	  there	  are	  interesting,	  later	  discussions	  on	  
similarities	   and	   differences	   between	   Peirce’s	   and	   Whewell’s	  
conceptions	   of	   the	   logic	  of	   science	   (Snyder	   1997;	  Niiniluoto	   1999a).	  
Regarding	   Aristotelean	   syllogisms,	   Peirce	   even	   speculated	   that	  
Aristotle	  had	  been	  formulating	  the	  basics	  of	  abduction	  in	  Prior	  Analytics	  
with	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘apagoge’,	  but	  this	  sense	  had	  been	  lost	  because	  the	  
text	   of	   Aristotle	   had	   been	   misunderstood	   and	   mistranslated	   as	   a	  
consequence	   of	   having	   been	   corrupted	   (CP	   1.65,	   c.	   1896).	   Later	   he	  
emphasised	  that	  this	  theory	  on	  the	  (mis)interpretation	  of	  Aristotle	  was	  
doubtful	  and	  only	  conjectural	  (CP	  8.209,	  c.	  1905).	  There	  are,	  however,	  
interesting	  recent	  interpretations	  maintaining	  that	  there	  are	  abductive	  
syllogisms	   present	   in	   Aristotle’s	   work	   but	   in	   places	   that	   Peirce	  
neglected.	  Abduction	  comes	  close	  to	  ‘anchinoia’,	  which	  is	  for	  Aristotle	  a	  
skill	  of	  conjecture	  or	  sagacity	  discovering	  or	  inferring	  a	  cause	  (Florez	  
2014).	  One	  interesting	  parallel	  to	  Peirce’s	  abduction	  (especially	  when	  
interpreted	  as	  a	  regressive	  inference	  of	  a	  cause	  from	  its	  effects)	  is	  the	  
method	   of	   analysis	   (where	   regressive	   inferences	   also	   play	   a	   central	  
part)	  and	  synthesis	  by	  Greek	  geometers,	  which	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  and	  
applied	  as	  heuristics	  in	  the	  history	  of	  science	  (Niiniluoto	  1999b).	  This	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2.2   Later  understandings  of  abduction  
	  
Abduction	  was	  for	  long	  quite	  marginally	  treated	  (Paavola	  2012,	  31-­‐‑45).	  
There	  were	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  for	  that.	  Peirce’s	  philosophy	  in	  general	  
was	  not	  much	  studied.	  The	  20th-­‐‑century	  philosophers	  of	  science	  (like	  
Popper	  and	  Hempel)	  were	  mostly	  against	  any	  logical	  treatments	  of	  the	  
area	  of	  discovery.	  Abduction	  was	  then	  seen	  as	  conflating	  discovery	  and	  
justification,	  as	  defined	  by	  Reichenbach	  (1938),	  and	  either	  being	  a	  form	  
of	  induction,	  or	  close	  to	  the	  hypothetico-­‐‑deductive	  model	  of	  science.	  A	  
notable	  exception	  was	  Hanson	  (1958)	  who	  defended	  Peirce’s	  “logic	  of	  
discovery”	   as	   a	   means	   of	   conceptualising	   what	   is	   the	   key	   issue	   in	  
science,	  that	  is,	  the	  search	  for	  new	  hypotheses.	  But	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  
late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s	  that	  abduction	  started	  to	  raise	  a	  broader	  
interest,	   especially	   in	   philosophy	   of	   science	   and	   in	   methodology	  
(Nickles	   1980;	   Eco	   and	   Sebeok	   1983).	   Besides	   Peircean	   tradition,	  
abduction	   is	   nowadays	   influenced	   also	   by	   the	   “Inference	   to	   the	  Best	  
Explanation”	  (IBE)	  model	  that	  was	  formulated	  by	  Harman	  in	  the	  late	  
1960s	  (Harman	  1965;	  1968).	  IBE	  is	  close	  to	  Peirce’s	  formulations	  on	  
abduction	  although	  there	  are	  also	  clear	  differences	  (Minnameier	  2004;	  
Paavola	  2006).	  	  
	  
Nowadays	   the	  uses	  and	  discussions	  on	  abduction	  have	  expanded	  on	  
various	  fields	  of	  research,	  such	  as	  logic,	  philosophy	  of	  science,	  research	  
methodology,	   semiotics,	   cognitive	   sciences,	   artificial	   intelligence	   and	  
diagnostics.	  It	  is	  then	  no	  wonder	  that	  there	  are	  different	  emphases	  and	  
interpretations	  of	  abduction.	  This	  might	  cause	  confusion	  but	  is	  also	  a	  
strength	  when	  formulations	  of	  abduction	  are	  developed	  further.	  	  
	  
Different	   kinds	   of	   distinctions	   and	   taxonomies	   on	   various	   forms	   of	  
abduction	   have	   been	   suggested.	   One	   distinction	   is	   if	   abduction	   is	  
supposed	   to	   be	   a	   way	   of	   generating	   new	   hypotheses	   (“creative	  
abduction”),	   or	   a	   way	   of	   evaluating	   and	   choosing	   a	   candidate	   from	  
given	  options	  (“selective	  abduction”)	  (Schurz	  2008;	  cf.	  Magnani	  2001;	  
Eco	  1983).	  Another	  basic	  distinction	  is	  if	  the	  abduced	  conclusion	  is	  a	  
singular	  fact,	  law,	  or	  theory	  (or	  a	  theoretical	  model)	  (Schurz	  2008).	  Still	  
another	  dimension	  is	  what	  triggers	  abductive	  reasoning:	  a	  novelty	  or	  
an	  anomaly,	  or	  perhaps	  just	  a	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  explained	  (see	  Aliseda	  
2006,	   45).	   Schurz	   (2008)	   presents	   a	   thorough	   classification	   of	  
abduction	  patterns,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  “special	  patterns	  of	  inference	  to	  the	  
best	   explanation”.	   Based	   on	   Schurz’	   classification,	   Hoffman	   (2010)	  
develops	  a	  taxonomy	  of	  15	  forms	  of	  abductive	  inference.	  
	  
Abduction	   is	   usually	   connected	   to	   searching	   for	   explanatory	  
hypotheses.	   However,	   according	   to	   Gabbay	   and	   Woods	   (2005)	  
abduction	  is	  not	  necessarily	  tied	  to	  explanation,	  but	  the	  characteristic	  
of	  abduction	  is	  that	  it	  is	  “ignorance-­‐‑preserving”	  reasoning,	  in	  contrast	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to	   deduction	   as	   “truth-­‐‑preserving”	   and	   induction	   as	   “probability-­‐‑
enhancing”.	   Furthermore,	   abduction	   can	   also	   be	   interpreted:	   more	  
clearly	  as	  a	  form	  of	  reasoning;	  or	  more	  closely	  related	  to	  such	  cognitive	  
issues	  as	  perception,	  guessing	  and	   insights;	  or	  as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  
process	  of	  inquiry	  (Paavola	  and	  Hakkarainen	  2005).	  
3   Abduction  in  design  
3.1   Prior  treatments  of  abduction  in  design  
 
March	   (1976)	   suggests	   that	   abduction,	   which	   he	   calls	   “productive	  
reasoning”,	  is	  the	  key	  mode	  of	  reasoning	  in	  design.	  He	  also	  points	  to	  the	  
confusion	   and	   misunderstanding	   created	   by	   not	   distinguishing	  
between	   scientific	   and	   design	   hypotheses,	   and	   between	   logical	  
propositions	  and	  design	  proposals.	  Whereas	   the	  goal	  of	   science	   is	   to	  
establish	   general	   laws,	  he	   says,	   design	   is	   concerned	  with	   realising	   a	  
particular	  outcome.	  The	  pattern	  of	   abduction	  proposed	  by	  March	   is:	  
from	   certain	   characteristics	   that	   are	   sought,	   and	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  
previous	  knowledge	  and	  models	  of	  possibilities,	  a	  design	  proposal	   is	  
put	  forward.	  March	  presents	  a	  three-­‐‑step	  cyclic	  design	  process	  that	  is	  
similar	   to	   Peirce’s	   three	   modes	   of	   reasoning	   (abduction-­‐‑deduction-­‐‑
induction),	  and	  says	  that	  rational	  designing	  has	  three	  tasks:	  
	  
1.   Creating	  a	  novel	  composition	  (i.e.,	  the	  artefact)	  as	  the	  outcome	  
(the	  ‘case’)	  of	  productive	  (=abductive)	  reasoning,	  
2.   Predicting	   the	   performance	   characteristics	   of	   the	   artefact	   by	  
deduction,	  
3.   Accumulating	   habitual	   notions	   and	   established	   values	   by	  
induction.	  
	  
Induction,	  therefore,	  may	  have	  two	  related	  roles:	  a	  background	  activity	  
that	  represents	  ongoing	  acquisition	  of	  experience	  and	  expertise,	  and	  an	  
evaluative	  step	  in	  the	  design	  cycles.	  
 
Goel	   (1988)	  proposes	   to	  extend	  and	  complicate	  March’s	  production-­‐‑
deduction-­‐‑induction	  model	   if	   we	  wish	   to	   use	   it	   in	   knowledge-­‐‑based	  
systems.	  He	  maintains	  that	  it	  is	  too	  simplistic	  to	  divide	  the	  phases	  of	  
design	  activity	  into	  three	  categories.	  His	  argument	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  laws	  (also	  called	  rules	  or	  knowledge)	  can	  have	  different	  logical	  
natures:	  some	  are	  universal,	  others	  statistical,	  and	  a	  third	  category	  is	  
the	  quasi-­‐‑laws	  that	  govern	  the	  behaviour	  of	  complex	  adaptive	  systems	  
such	   as	   humans	   and	   organisations.	   Depending	   on	   the	   type	   of	   law	  
involved,	  the	  prediction	  of	  performance	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  a	  deductive	  
inference,	   and	   the	   inference	   of	   design	   descriptions,	   while	   still	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abductive,	  poses	  new	  problems	  related	  to	  affirming	  the	  consequent	  and	  
to	  instantiating	  an	  individual.	  
	  
Takeda	  et	  al.	  (1990)	  propose	  a	  cognitive	  model	  of	  the	  design	  process	  
based	  on	  general	  design	  theory	  (GDT),	  which	  contains	  three	  types	  of	  
reasoning:	  deduction,	  abduction	  and	  circumscription.	  Circumscription	  
is	  used	  to	  find	  exceptions	  that	  cause	  a	  contradiction,	  so	  the	  incomplete	  
knowledge	  of	  object	  properties	  and	  behaviours	  at	  any	  time	  during	  the	  
design	  process	  can	  be	  modified.	  The	  design	  process	  consists	  of	  a	  5-­‐‑step	  
cycle:	  (1)	  identification	  of	  problems	  by	  comparing	  the	  designed	  object	  
with	  the	  required	  specifications,	  (2)	  suggestion	  of	  key	  concepts	  to	  solve	  
the	   problems,	   (3)	   development	   of	   candidate	   solutions	   from	   the	   key	  
concepts	   and	   design	   knowledge,	   (4)	   evaluation	   to	   confirm	   the	  
candidate	  solutions,	  and	  (5)	  conclusion	  to	  decide	  which	  candidate	  to	  
adopt.	  Step	  (1)	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  circumscription,	  step	  (2)	  by	  abduction,	  
and	   steps	   (3)	   and	   (4)	   by	   deduction.	   Step	   (5)	   is	   a	   decision-­‐‑making	  
process	  that	  is	  not	  analysed	  with	  the	  logical	  framework.	  Step	  (2),	  the	  
abductive	  step,	  basically	  follows	  the	  paradigm:	  from	  the	  properties	  of	  
the	  current	  design	  candidate	  and	  the	  knowledge	  of	  object	  properties	  
and	  behaviour	  available	  at	  the	  current	  state,	  obtain	  a	  description	  of	  the	  
current	  design	  candidate.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  “standard”	  
syllogism	  of	  “given	  fact	  +	  major	  premise	  à	  conclusion”.	  
	  
Takeda	   (1994)	   continues	   this	   work,	   but	   emphasises	   the	   role	   of	  
abduction	  as	  the	  ampliative	  process	  of	  making	  integrated	  hypotheses	  
and	  theories.	  He	  claims	  that	  Peirce’s	  abduction	  is	  unattractive	  in	  design	  
because	   it	   only	   enumerates	   many	   hypotheses.	   In	   contrast,	   design	  
abduction	   is	   different	   because	   it	   not	   only	   generates	   hypotheses	  
(descriptions	  of	  objects),	  but	  also	  considers	  the	  background	  theory	  and	  
uses	  part	  of	  it,	  the	  “explanatory	  theory”,	  by	  selecting	  relevant	  rules	  and	  
laws	  and	  even	  generating	  new	  ones.	  Takeda’s	  view	  on	  design	  abduction	  
is	   therefore	   a	   step	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   Roozenburg’s	   innovative	  
abduction	  (see	  below).	  
 
The	  design	  support	  system	  proposed	  by	  Takeda	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  is	  based	  
on	  a	  model	  of	  the	  design	  process	  that	  consists	  of	  iterations	  of	  abduction	  
(to	  create	  a	  new	  idea	  or	  artifact)	  and	  deduction	  (to	  validate	  the	  design).	  
They	  claim	  that	  creative	  design	  must	  contain	  two	  aspects:	  generating	  a	  
new	  product	  and	  expansion	  of	  knowledge.	  Abduction	   should	   include	  
more	   types	   of	   reasoning	   then	   Peirce’s	   “abduction	   as	   inversed	  
deduction”,	  which	  is	  merely	  one	  category	  of	  factual	  abduction.	  It	  should	  
include	  also	  discovery	  of	  new	  laws.	  Factual	  abduction	  is	  used	  to	  create	  
a	   new	   design	   while	   law	   abduction	   creates	   a	   new	   theory.	   Both	  
abductions	   take	   place	   concurrently	   to	   achieve	   “integration	   of	  
knowledge”.	   Among	   the	   several	   methods	   that	   can	   be	   used	   for	   law	  
abduction	  (some	  of	  which	  are	  mentioned	  by	  Schurz	  (2008)),	  they	  focus	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on	  analogical	  inference.	  The	  procedure	  for	  carrying	  out	  the	  analogical	  
abduction	  starts	  by	  choosing	  a	  candidate	  theory	  (i.e.,	  knowledge	  base),	  
preferably	  one	  with	  low	  similarity	  to	  the	  original	  knowledge	  in	  order	  
to	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  surprising	  result.	  Next,	  correspondences	  
are	   created	   among	   concepts	   in	   the	   chosen	   theories,	   followed	   by	  
generation	  of	  candidate	  design	  knowledge,	  which	  are	  the	  hypotheses	  
found	   appropriate	   to	   solve	   the	   current	   design	   problem.	   Finally,	  
candidate	   design	   solutions	   are	   created	   from	   the	   new	   integrated	  
knowledge	  by	  a	  process	  of	  hypothesis	  verification.	  
	  
Tomiyama	  et	   al.	   (2003)	   connect	   the	  above	  work	  even	  more	  strongly	  
with	   Schurz’s	   classification.	   They	   claim	   that	   Schurz’s	   first	   order	  
existential	  abduction	  (one	  type	  of	  his	  factual	  abductions)	  can	  generate	  
a	   design	   that	   performs	   given	   requirements,	   but	   because	   both	   the	  
requirements	   and	   rules	   are	   known,	   no	   creative	   design	   can	   result.	  
Another	   important	   type	   is	   theoretical-­‐‑fact	   abduction	   that	   generates	  
new	   initial	   or	   boundary	   conditions	   that	   apply	   to	   the	   yet-­‐‑unknown	  
design	   solution.	   This	   abduction	   does	   not	   generate	   solutions,	   but	  
conditions	   that	   the	   solution	   should	   satisfy.	   These	   conditions	   can	  
become	  new	  design	  sub-­‐‑problems	  or	  additional	  requirements.	  A	  third	  
type	  of	  abduction	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  modes	  of	  Schurz’s	  second	  order	  
existential	  abduction,	  and	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  integrating	  multiple	  theories.	  
This	  “abduction	  for	  integration”	  consists	  of	  identifying	  the	  applicability	  
and	   domain	   of	   seemingly	   irrelevant	   theories	   (as	   in	   analogical	  
reasoning)	  and	  merging	  them	  with	  the	  existing	  knowledge.	  
 
Roozenburg	   (1993)	   discusses	   in	   depth	   the	   question	   whether	   the	  
reasoning	   towards	  a	   tentative	  description	  of	   a	  design	  with	  plausible	  
reasoning	   follows	  the	  conventional	  view	  on	  abduction,	  or	  whether	   it	  
should	  be	  defined	  differently.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  commonly	  presented	  
view,	   especially	   in	   artificial	   intelligence	   literature,	   deals	   with	  
“explanatory”	   abductions,	   which	   are	   good	   for	   diagnosis	   or	  
troubleshooting,	  but	  that	  the	  core	  of	  design	  reasoning	  follows	  another	  
type	   of	   abduction,	   for	   which	   he	   proposes	   the	   terms	   “innovative”	  
abduction	  and	  “innoduction”	  (Roozenburg	  and	  Eekels,	  1995).	   In	   fact,	  
says	   Roozenburg	   (1993),	   Habermas	   (1978)	   distinguished	   between	  
explanatory	  abduction	  and	  innovative	  abduction,	  and	  it	  was	  March	  who	  
did	  not	  make	  that	  distinction.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  innovative	  abduction,	  says	  
Roosenburg,	  “Starting	  from	  a	  surprising,	  not	  yet	  explainable	  fact	  (the	  
result),	  we	  try	  to	  conceive	  of	  a	  new	  rule	  (a	  principle,	  law,	  or	  theory)	  that	  
allows	  us	  to	  infer	  the	  cause	  (the	  case);	  the	  rule	  itself,	  therefore,	  is	  not	  
yet	  assumed	  to	  be	  true”.	  He	  goes	  on	  explaining	  that	  the	  conclusion	  of	  
this	  inference	  is	  a	  hypothesis	  that	  still	  needs	  to	  be	  tested	  by	  deduction	  
and	   induction	   before	   it	   becomes	   a	   new	   rule	  with	   explaining	   power.	  
Roozenburg’s	  pattern	  of	  innovative	  abduction	  is	  therefore:	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q (q is a given fact, a desired result) 
----------------------------------------------------- 
p à q (a rule to be inferred first, IF p THEN q) 
p (p is the conclusion, the cause, that immediately follows) 
 
He	   even	   says	   that	   the	   above	   pattern	   is	   Peirce’s	   original	   intention,	  
because	  p	   cannot	  be	  part	  of	   the	  premise	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  part	  of	   the	  
conclusion	  of	  the	  inference	  (cf.	  CP	  5.189,	  1903).	  This	  means	  that	  both	  p	  
à	  q	  and	  p	  ‘present’	  themselves	  together,	  at	  the	  same	  moment.	  
	  
Roozenburg’s	  innovative	  abduction	  is	  claimed	  to	  represent	  the	  kernel	  
of	   the	   design	   process.	   The	   desired	   result	   is	   the	   function	   to	   be	  
accomplished,	  his	  rule	   follows	  the	   formula	  “if	  form	  +	  way	  of	  use	   then	  
function”,	  and	  the	  conclusion	  is	  form	  +	  way	  of	  use.	  	  
 
Dorst	  (2011)	  proposes	  another	  view	  on	  design	  abduction	  that	  revolves	  
around	  the	  following	  formula:	  
 
what (the artefact) + how (the working principle) à value (aspired) 
 
in	  which	  the	  (aspired)	  value	   is	  always	  given.	   If	   the	  how	   is	  also	  given,	  
then	   the	   what	   is	   generated	   by	   a	   so-­‐‑called	   abduction-­‐‑1,	   which	   is	  
precisely	  “explanatory”	  abduction.	  Dorst	  calls	  this	  case	  “conventional	  
(‘closed’)	   problem-­‐‑solving	   that	   designers	   often	   do”.	   If,	   however,	   the	  
how	  is	  not	  given,	  then	  we	  have	  a	  more	  ‘open’	  problem	  in	  which	  we	  need	  
to	   decide	   on	   both	   the	   working	   principle	   and	   the	   artefact.	   This	   is	  
accomplished	   by	   abduction-­‐‑2,	   which	   is	   the	   same	   as	   Roozenburg’s	  
innovative	  abduction.	  Abduction-­‐‑2	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  first	  developing	  or	  
adopting	  a	  ‘frame’	  (after	  Schön),	  which	  is	  a	  “general	  implication	  that	  by	  
applying	  a	   certain	  working	  principle	  we	  will	   create	  a	   specific	  value”.	  
The	   framing	   activity	   is	   characterised	   by	   Dorst	   as	   being	   “a	   form	   of	  
induction”,	  because	  it	  is	  reasoning	  back	  from	  consequences	  (this	  is	  in	  
conflict	   with	   Peirce	   to	   whom	   that	   kind	   of	   reasoning	   represents	  
abduction).	  With	  the	  help	  of	  framing,	  abduction-­‐‑2	  takes	  place	  according	  
to	  the	  following	  pattern:	  
 
q (q is the given desired value) 
----------------------------------------------------- 
p à q (IF how THEN value, the first conclusion) 
p (how, the second conclusion) 
 
When	  a	  possible	  or	  promising	  frame	  has	  been	  proposed	  and	  the	  how	  is	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Kolko	   (2010)	   defines	   design	   synthesis	   as	   an	   abductive	   sensemaking	  
process	  of	  manipulating,	  organizing,	  pruning	  and	  filtering	  data	  related	  
to	  the	  design	  problem	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  information	  and	  knowledge.	  
Three	   methods	   of	   formalising	   the	   synthesis	   process	   are	   proposed:	  
reframing,	   concept	   mapping	   and	   insight	   combination.	   Each	   of	   the	  
methods	   emphasises	   actions	   of	   prioritising,	   judging	   and	   forging	  
connections,	  which	  are	  claimed	  to	  have	  been	  derived	  directly	  from	  the	  
logical	  processes	  of	  abduction	  and	  the	  cognitive	  psychology	  theory	  of	  
sensemaking.	  However,	   the	   connection	   of	   these	   actions	   to	   abductive	  
reasoning	  seems	  rather	  loose,	  and	  is	  mostly	  based	  on	  Kolko’s	  claim	  that	  
abduction	   (defined	   as	   IBE)	   is	   the	   only	   type	   of	   inference	   that	   can	  
generate	   something	   new,	   and	   that	   it	   involves	   intuition	   and	   the	  
designer’s	  own	  life	  experiences.	  
 
Lu	   and	   Liu	   (2012)	   refer	   to	   Peirce’s	   description	   of	   abduction	   as	  
“intelligent	   guessing”	   and	   show	   how	   abductive	   reasoning	   can	   be	  
applied	   in	   three	   different	   ways	   to	   design	   synthesis:	   (1)	   inferring	  
functional	  requirements	  from	  the	  customer’s	  need,	  (2)	  deriving	  design	  
concepts	   from	   the	   requirements,	   and	   (3)	   diagnosing	   faults	   within	  
design	  concepts	  to	  facilitate	  the	  selection	  among	  them.	  Using	  Schurz’s	  
classification,	  Lu	  and	  Liu	  associate	  these	  three	  types	  with	  second	  order	  
existential	   abduction,	   factual	   or	   law	   abduction,	   and	   observable-­‐‑fact	  
abduction,	  respectively.	  	  	  
 
Ullah	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  attempt	  to	  connect	  the	  notion	  of	  “classical	  abduction”	  
to	  the	  C–K	  theory	  of	  design.	  They	  conclude	  that	  conceiving	  a	  creative	  
(“undecided”	  relative	  to	  existing	  knowledge)	  concept	  is	  more	  complex	  
than	   abduction,	   being	   a	   motivation-­‐‑driven	   process.	   Motivation	   here	  
consists	  of	  a	  “compelling	  reason”—why	  a	  certain	  concept	  is	  pursued,	  
and	  an	  “epistemic	  challenge”—seeking	  new	  knowledge.	  
	  
Pauwels	   and	   Bod	   (2014)	   adopt	   Peirce's	   model	   of	   scientific	   inquiry,	  
claiming	  that	  it	  (and	  design)	  consists	  of	  repetitive	  cycles	  of	  abduction	  
(to	   make	   hypotheses	   and	   interpretations	   of	   "the	   world"	   or	   "the	  
situation"),	   deduction	   (to	   make	   predictions	   of	   anticipated	  
consequences),	   and	   induction	   (to	   devise	   experiments	   to	   test	   the	  
anticipated	  consequences	  and	  to	  learn	  new	  knowledge).	  Abduction	  is	  
identified	   here	   with	   analogical	   thinking	   and	   the	   design	   cycle	   is	  
demonstrated	   through	  an	  example	  of	   a	  kitchen	   sketching	  episode.	   It	  
starts	  with	  the	  designer	  looking	  at	  a	  partial	  sketch	  and	  trying	  to	  find	  an	  
explanation	   (analogy,	   interpretation,	   idea)	   to	   it	   by	   abduction.	   The	  
abduction	   results	   in	   a	   hypothesis	   that	   a	   specific	   other	   configuration	  
might	   improve	   the	   design.	   Now,	   from	   this	   hypothesis,	   the	   designer	  
deduces	   a	   specific	   prediction	   about	   what	   to	   do	   next,	   resulting	   in	  
consequences:	   re-­‐‑arranging	   the	   sketch	   lines	   so	   that	   the	   kitchen	  will	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improve.	  Finally,	  an	  induction	  step	  is	  used	  to	  verify	  that	  the	  new	  design	  
has	  indeed	  been	  improved,	  and	  this	  step	  constitutes	  learning.	  
	  
More	   recently,	   a	   need-­‐‑function-­‐‑principle-­‐‑system	   (NFPS)	   model	   has	  
been	   proposed	   for	   conceptual	   design	   (Chen	   et	   al.	   2015a;	   2015b).	   A	  
clarification	   stage	   converts	  subjective	  needs	   into	  objective	   functions,	  
followed	  by	  a	  synthesis	  stage	  to	  find	  abstract	  principles	  for	  satisfying	  
the	  functions.	  The	  abstract	  principles	  consist	  of	  combinations	  of	  action	  
classes	   and	   behaviour	   classes,	   which	   are	   generalised	   actions	   and	  
behaviours,	   respectively.	   Next	   comes	   an	   embodiment	   stage,	   where	  
action	  classes	  and	  behaviour	  classes	  are	  instantiated	  as	  a	  system	  (i.e.,	  
structure)	  having	  corresponding	  specific	  actions	  and	  behaviours.	  The	  
actions	  and	  behaviours	  are	  verified	  in	  an	  analysis	  stage,	  followed	  by	  a	  
prediction	   stage	   to	   identify	   unintended	   side	   effects	   and	   possibly	  
generate	  new	  functions	   for	   the	  next	  design	  cycle.	  Both	  synthesis	  and	  
development	   stages	   are	   claimed	   to	   be	   “implicit	   abductions”	   or	  
innoductions,	  because	  they	  lack	  sufficient	  premises	  for	  generating	  only	  
one	  result.	  
 
An	  empirical	  approach	  to	  study	  abduction	  in	  design	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  
Cramer-­‐‑Petersen	   and	   Ahmed-­‐‑Kristensen	   (2015).	   They	   define	  
abduction	  as	  the	  use	  of	  a	  known	  principle,	  law	  or	  theory	  for	  the	  purpose	  
of	   a	   causal	   explanation,	   and	   investigate	   aspects	   of	   idea-­‐‑generation	  
sessions	  by	  protocol	  analyses.	  Abductive	  reasoning	  is	  identified	  by	  the	  
use	  of	   the	   following	   “indicator	  words”:	  could,	  maybe,	   think,	   could	  be,	  
imagine,	  probably,	   likely;	  deductive	  by	  so,	  then,	  therefore,	  that	  is,	  must	  
be,	  as,	  can;	  and	  induction	  is	  correlated	  with	  I,	  me,	  you,	  they,	  we,	  them.	  
They	  found	  that	  abduction	  was	  the	  least	  frequent	  type	  of	  reasoning	  in	  
the	  protocols,	  although	  most	  ideas	  were	  initiated	  by	  it.	  The	  explanation	  
was	  that	  abduction	  only	  requires	  a	  few	  statements	  to	  hypothesise	  and	  
introduce	   new	   frames	   of	   understanding	   the	   problem.	   Similarly,	   the	  
high	   proportion	   of	   deductive	   reasoning	  was	   explained	   by	   observing	  
that	  deduction	  often	  comes	   in	  series	  of	  several	  statements	  about	   the	  
structure	   of	   an	   idea.	   Inductive	   reasoning	   was	   found	   to	   occur	   more	  
frequently	   than	   abductive	   reasoning,	   but	   its	   occurrences	   rarely	  
happened	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   idea-­‐‑generation	   episodes.	   They	   also	  
found	   that	   abductive	   reasoning	   led	   to	   more	   radical	   ideas,	   whereas	  
deductive	   reasoning	   led	   to	   ideas	   related	   to	   project	   requirements	  
(especially	   cost	   reduction).	   The	   latter	   type	   had	   a	   higher	   proportion	  
being	  rejected	  as	  not	  valuable.	  
3.2   Critical  evaluation  of  prior  treatments  of  abduction  in  design  
	  
The	   previous	   section	   has	   made	   it	   clear	   that	   there	   is	   a	   variety	   of	  
interpretations	  of	  abduction	  in	  design.	  They	  do	  not	  provide	  a	  unified	  
picture	  of	  abduction.	  In	  this	  section,	  the	  prior	  treatments	  of	  abduction	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in	   design	   are	   analyzed	   and	   critically	   evaluated.	   The	   discussion	   is	  
structured	   according	   to	   the	   main	   topics	   arising	   from	   the	   materials	  
examined.	  
3.2.1   Lacking  interest  and  contribution  by  philosophers  and  logicians  
	  
It	   is	  striking	   that	  understanding	  on	  design	  abduction	  has	  exclusively	  
been	   advanced	   by	   scholars	   in	   the	   design	   domain.	   Professional	  
philosophers	  have	  shown	  little	  interest	  in	  the	  clarification	  of	  abduction	  
in	  design.	  This	  is	  further	  exemplified	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  authoritative	  
and	   thorough	   handbook	   Philosophy	   of	   technology	   and	   engineering	  
sciences	  (Gabbay	  et	  al.	  2009)	  has	  “deductive	  reasoning”	  in	  its	  index,	  but	  
nothing	  on	  abduction.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  inevitable	  academic	  division	  
of	  work	  has	   implied	  that	   the	  studies	  of	  design	  scholars	  on	  abduction	  
tend	   to	  be	   thin	  on	   the	  side	  of	  philosophy	  of	   science	  and	   logic.	  There	  
have	  been	  basic	  misunderstandings	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  literature	  
in	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  
3.2.2   Fragmentation  and  divergence  
	  
The	   existence	   of	   various	   somewhat	   different	   characterizations	   of	  
abduction	   already	   by	   Peirce	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   unity	   in	   philosophy	   of	  
science	   regarding	   abduction	   has	   led	   to	   a	   situation	   where	   design	  
scholars	   have	   picked	   up	   somewhat	   varying	   concepts	   and	  
interpretations	   of	   abduction	   and	   often	   developed	   them	   into	   new	  
directions.	  It	  seems	  that	  this	  reflects	  partially	  the	  breadth	  of	  discussion	  
within	  the	  area	  of	  design,	  and	  also	  of	  abduction.	  Arguably,	  however,	  this	  
situation	   has	   tended	   to	   lead	   to	   fragmentation	   of	   discussion,	   lacking	  
accumulation	  of	  understanding	  and	  divergence	  on	  views	  on	  abduction.	  
3.2.3   Methodological  issues  
	  
Most	   research	   into	   design	   abduction	   is	   conceptual,	   driven	   by	   the	  
pursuit	  of	  adoption	  and	  adaption	  of	  abduction	  concepts	  from	  science	  to	  
design.	  The	  developed	  design	  abduction	  concepts	  are	   illustrated—or	  
perhaps	   initially	   justified—through	   schematic	   or	   worked	   examples.	  
Empirical	   research	   on	   abduction	   in	   general	   has	   been	   scarce	   (cf.	  
Cramer-­‐‑Petersen	   &	   Ahmed-­‐‑Kristensen	   2015;	   Dunne	   &	   Dougherty	  
2016).	  
3.2.4   Contextual  differences  between  science  and  design  
	  
Although	  the	  contextual	  differences	  between	  science	  and	  design	  were	  
discussed	  already	   in	   the	   seminal	   contribution	  by	  March	   (1976),	   it	   is	  
doubtful	   whether	   they	   have	   been	   fully	   covered	   in	   design	   abduction	  
research.	  In	  the	  following,	  the	  topics	  arising	  from	  such	  differences	  are	  
discussed.	  
	  
	   14	  
3.2.4.1   Starting  point  for  abduction  
	  
In	   the	   accounts	   on	   science,	   there	   is	   usually	   a	   focal	   point,	   surprising	  
observation	   or	   anomaly,	   that	   forms	   a	   starting	   point	   for	   abduction.	  
Based	  on	  this,	  singular	  (and	  often	  celebrated)	  acts	  of	  abduction	  have	  
been	  addressed	   in	  discussions	  on	  abduction	   in	   science	   (for	  example,	  
Hanson	   1958).	   However,	   as	   Hanson	   himself	   pointed	   out,	   discovery	  
processes	   often	   extend	   over	   longer	   time	   periods	   (ibid.)	   and	   clearly	  
involve	  several	  mixed	  forms	  of	  reasoning.	  In	  treatments	  on	  abduction	  
in	  design,	  the	  focus	  similarly	  has	  been	  on	  singular	  abduction	  from	  the	  
problem	  to	  the	  solution,	  usually	  from	  function	  to	  structure.	  However,	  
the	   design	   counterpart	   for	   surprising	   observations	   in	   science	   has	  
hardly	  been	  discussed	  and	  characterized.	  
	  
Another	   question	   hardly	   discussed	   is	   related	   to	   the	   location	   of	  
abduction	   in	   the	   respective	   process.	   In	   science,	   abduction	   is	   located	  
next	   to	   the	   surprising	   observation,	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   research	  
cycle.	  This	  is	  in	  connection	  to	  the	  situation	  where	  in	  science	  typically	  
one	   aspect	   or	   part	   of	   a	   phenomenon	   is	   explained	   (Eekels	   and	  
Roozenburg	   1991).	   However,	   in	   design,	   the	   totality	   of	   the	   targeted	  
artefact	  is	  designed.	  This	  implies	  that	  in	  design,	  a	  problematic	  situation	  
(requiring	  an	  abductive	  solution)	  may	  occur	  in	  any	  part	  of	  the	  design	  
process,	   not	   only	   at	   its	   start,	   and	   that	   there	  may	   be	  many	   different	  
problems	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  a	  design	  cycle.	  	  
3.2.4.2   The  abductive  inference  
	  
The	  approaches	  to	  design	  abduction	  have	  not	  always	  been	  sensitive	  to	  
differences	  in	  the	  type	  of	  inference	  in	  science	  and	  design.	  March	  (1976)	  
explained	  that	  abduction	  in	  science	  is	  about	  generalisation,	  whereas	  in	  
design	   it	   is	   about	   particularisation.	  However,	   the	   situation	   in	  design	  
(and	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  also	  in	  science)	  is	  more	  nuanced.	  Often	  also	  in	  
design,	  the	  first	  step	  is	  to	  find	  an	  (abstract)	  natural	  law	  or	  fundamental	  
concept,	  from	  which	  the	  form	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  artefact	  is	  abducted.	  
Thus,	   abductions	   in	   both	  ways,	   generalisation	   and	   particularisation,	  
occur	  in	  design.	  	  
	  
Another	   question	   is	   that	   in	   the	   classical	   treatment	   of	   abduction	   in	  
science,	  the	  inference	  is	  a	  regressive	  one,	  from	  effect	  to	  cause.	  This	  idea	  
has	  largely	  been	  accepted	  also	  for	  design	  abduction.	  However,	  there	  are	  
other	   types	   of	   problems	   in	   design,	   say	   decomposition	   of	   functions,	  
physical	   composition	   of	   the	   artefact	   or	   finding	   the	   most	   suitable	  
framing	   for	  a	  design	  problem.	  Whether	  ampliative	  solutions	  to	   these	  
should	  be	  viewed	  as	  types	  of	  abduction	  has	  not	  been	  discussed.	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3.2.4.3   Relation  of  abduction  to  other  forms  of  inferences  in  science  
and  design  
	  
The	   Peircean	   definition	   of	   abduction	   as	   a	   third	   form	   of	   reasoning,	  
besides	   deduction	   and	   induction,	   is	   adopted	   by	   authors	   on	   design	  
abduction.	   However,	   the	   relation	   of	   abduction	   to	   other	   forms	   of	  
reasoning	  and	  mixed	  forms	  of	  reasoning	  in	  design	  tend	  to	  remain	  vague	  
as	  there	  is	  little	  scholarly	  consensus	  on	  reasoning	  types	  in	  design.	  Also,	  
that	  Peirce,	  in	  his	  later	  works,	  defines	  induction	  in	  a	  non-­‐‑conventional	  
manner	   has	   not	   been	   discussed	   in	   design	   abduction	   literature.	   The	  
question	  whether	  all	  regressive	  inferences	  in	  design	  are	  identified	  as	  
abduction	  remains	  without	  substantive	  discussion.	  	  
3.2.4.4   Outcome  of  abduction  
	  
In	  science,	  the	  outcome	  of	  abduction	  is	  hypothetical.	  In	  design,	  the	  same	  
applies	  as	  more	  or	  less	  all	  intermediate	  outcomes	  are	  hypothetical	  until	  
the	   final	   validation.	  However,	   in	   design	   there	  are	   additional	   criteria.	  
The	  embodiment	  design	  stage	  can	  embrace	  only	  such	  forms,	  materials	  
and	   assemblies	   that	   can	   be	   realised	   in	   the	   purported	   context.	   These	  
have	  not	  been	  discussed	  in	  prior	  treatments.	  
3.2.4.5   Context  for  novelty  
	  
In	   science	   the	   context	   of	   abduction,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   end,	   is	   the	  whole	  
scientific	  community	  interested	  in	  the	  topic	  in	  question.	  Thus,	  novelty	  
depends	  on	  what	  is	  known	  by	  the	  community.	  In	  design,	  it	  is	  rather	  an	  
individual	   designer	   or	   a	   design	   team,	   who	   provide	   the	   context	   for	  
abduction.	  Novelty	  is	  thus	  relative	  to	  what	  is	  known	  by	  the	  designer	  or	  
a	  design	  team.	  This	  issue	  has	  hardly	  been	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  
design	  abduction.	  
3.2.5   Design  creativity  
	  
The	   literature	   on	   abduction	   in	   design	   makes	   little	   reference	   to	   the	  
literature	  on	  design	  creativity,	  although	  the	  subject	  matter	  in	  these	  two	  
fields	  seems	  highly	  overlapping,	  namely	  emergence	  of	  novelty.	  
3.3   Reflections  on  abduction:  Potential  problems  in  Peirce’s  
conception  of  abduction  
	  
The	  difficulties	  of	  conceiving	  the	  form	  and	  role	  of	  abduction	  in	  design,	  
as	   discussed	   above,	   seem	   to	   derive,	   at	   least	   partly,	   from	   the	   specific	  
features	  of	  Peirce’s	  treatment	  of	  abduction	  and	  gaps	  in	  its	  subsequent	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interpretations4.	  Such	  problems	  are	  especially	  related	  to	  using	  only	  the	  
logical	   scheme	   of	   syllogism	   as	   the	   starting	   point,	   the	   position	   of	  
induction	   in	   relation	   to	   abduction,	   and	   the	   relation	   of	   abduction	   to	  
regressive	  inferences	  as	  they	  occur	  in	  the	  method	  of	  analysis.	  	  
	  
Peirce	   started	   his	   research	   on	   abduction	   by	   using	   the	   syllogistic	  
approach	  to	  logic,	  originated	  by	  Aristotle,	  to	  illustrate	  the	  differences	  
between	  deduction,	  induction	  and	  abduction.	  Syllogisms	  had	  been	  the	  
dominant	   approach	   in	   logic	   for	   several	   centuries	   till	   the	   mid	   19th	  
century,	  when	  new	  approaches	  started	  to	  be	  developed	  (actually	  Peirce	  
was	  among	  the	  initiators	  of	  these).	  A	  syllogism	  is	  an	  inference	  from	  two	  
premises,	   both	   containing	   a	   “middle	   term”	   that	   thus	   connects	   them,	  
towards	   a	   conclusion	   (Lagerlund	   2016).	   The	   problem	   with	   the	  
syllogistic	   conception	   of	   an	   abductive	   inference	   is	   that	   the	   new	   idea	  
seems	  already	  to	  be	  in	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  inference	  instead	  of	  being	  
created	   through	   that	   inference 5 	  (see	   section	   3.1).	   The	   syllogistic	  
conception	  thus	  seems	  to	  compromise	  the	  central	  notion	  of	  abduction	  
engendering	  a	  new	  idea.	  It	  might	  be	  one	  reason	  for	  Peirce	  to	  adopt	  the	  
broader	  view	  of	  abduction	  as	  a	  stage	  in	  the	  research	  process	  (Psillos	  
2009).	  	  
	  
The	  existence	  of	   these	  two	  Peircean	  conceptions	  of	  abduction	  (as	  an	  
inference	  and	  as	  a	  stage	  in	  a	  research	  process),	  and	  also	  the	  discussions	  
on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   syllogistic	   presentation	   of	   abduction	   have	   been	  
confusing.	  It	  seems	  this	  was	  the	  reason	  for	  Habermas	  (1978)	  coining	  
the	  terms	  explanatory	  abduction	  and	   innovative	  abduction,	  based	  on	  
which	   Roozenburg	   (1993)	   saw	   it	   necessary	   to	   invent	   the	   term	  
“innoduction”,	   innovative	   abduction.	  However,	   as	   he	   himself	   admits,	  
this	  kind	  of	  abduction	  is	  what	  Peirce	  may	  have	  had	  in	  mind.	  Thus,	  the	  
necessity	  of	  a	  new	  name	  for	  it	  can	  be	  questioned.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Recent	  developments	  of	  abduction	  in	  philosophy	  of	  science	  highlight	  broader	  and	  
more	  dynamic	  understanding	  of	  this	  concept	  but	  they	  have	  not	  yet	  had	  impact	  on	  the	  
research	  on	  abduction	  in	  design.	  
5	  	   	  Psillos	  (2009)	  states	  on	  this:	  “This	  creates	  a	  certain	  tension	  in	  Peirce’s	  account.	  
Hypothesis	  is	  ampliative	  and	  the	  sole	  generator	  of	  new	  ideas	  or	  content.	  And	  yet,	  in	  
the	   syllogistic	   conception	   of	   hypothetic	   inference,	   the	   new	   ideas	   or	   content	  must	  
already	   be	   there	   before	   they	   are	   accepted	   as	   the	   conclusion	   of	   the	   inference.”	  
However,	  this	  commonly	  presented	  view	  can	  be	  debated.	  Verene	  (2008)	  has	  argued	  
that	  Aristotle’s	  theory	  of	  syllogisms	  was	  actually	  twofold:	  a	  syllogism	  serves	  both	  as	  
an	  instrument	  of	  demonstration	  and	  as	  a	  means	  for	  the	  generation	  of	  new	  ideas.	  Thus	  
(Verene	  1980):	  “The	  invention	  of	  an	  argument	  requires	  the	  invention	  of	  the	  middle	  
term	  of	  the	  syllogism.	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  middle	  term	  and	  the	  needed	  premises	  are	  
aspects	  of	  a	  common	  process;	  they	  come	  into	  being	  at	  the	  same	  time.”	  If	  we	  subscribe	  
to	  the	  conception	  of	  syllogisms	  as	  advanced	  by	  Verene,	  the	  tension	  alleged	  by	  Psillos	  
disappears	  (see	  also	  Paavola	  2004).	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Another	   source	   of	   confusion	   is	   related	   to	   induction.	   In	   the	   early	  
writings	  of	  Peirce,	  induction	  was	  about	  generalisation	  of	  a	  rule	  from	  a	  
sample,	  corresponding	  to	  the	  still	  common	  usage	  of	  this	  term.	  However,	  
in	  his	  later	  work,	  the	  meaning	  of	  induction	  switched	  to	  confirmation	  of	  
an	   abductive	   hypothesis	   through	   experimental	   verification6.	   Both	   in	  
the	   earlier	   and	   later	   conception	   by	   Peirce,	   abduction	  was	   related	   to	  
deduction	   and	   induction;	  however,	   the	  meaning	   of	   induction	   is	   very	  
different	  in	  these	  two	  cases.	  	  
	  
Based	  on	  the	  conception	  of	  Peirce	  of	  the	  scientific	  process	  as	  abduction-­‐‑
deduction-­‐‑induction,	   March	   (1976)	   presents	   a	   tripartite	   model	   of	  
design,	  consisting	  of	  the	  corresponding	  stages	  of	  production,	  deduction	  
and	   induction.	   However,	   when	   trying	   to	   fit	   design	   into	   the	   mold	  
provided	  by	  science,	  he	  mistakenly—so	  it	  seems	  to	  us—describes	  the	  
last	  stage	  as	   follows:	  “the	  design	  and	   its	  expected	  characteristics	  are	  
used	  to	  infer	  new	  generalisations”.	  In	  our	  view,	  the	  evaluation	  stage	  in	  
design	   is	   occupied	   by	   the	   question	   whether	   the	   design	   fulfills	   the	  
requirements	  of	  the	  particular	  situation;	  it	  is	  not	  primarily	  about	  the	  
generalisation.	   Also	   Pauwels	   and	   Bod	   (2014)	   similarly	   adopt	   the	  
tripartite	   model	   of	   Peirce,	   and	   call	   the	   evaluation	   stage	   in	   the	  
architectural	  process	  induction.	  
	  
The	  third	  source	  of	  confusion	  is	  the	  question	  how	  abduction	  relates	  to	  
regressive	   inferences	   as	   they	   occur	   in	   the	   stage	   of	   analysis	   in	   the	  
context	   of	   the	   geometrical	  method	   of	   analysis	   (Hintikka	   and	   Remes	  
1974).	  This	  method	  has	  been	  influential	  in	  science;	  no	  less	  figure	  than	  
Newton (2003)	  writes	  on	  analysis	  in	  Opticks: “By	  this	  way	  of	  Analysis	  
we	  may	  proceed	  from	  Compounds	  to	  Ingredients,	  from	  Motions	  to	  the	  
Forces	   producing	   them;	   in	   general,	   from	   Effects	   to	   their	   Causes,	   …”.	  
During	  the	  active	  years	  of	  Peirce,	  the	  method	  of	  analysis	  was	  adopted	  
as	  the	  scientific	  model	  by	  several	  leading	  scientists	  and	  philosophers	  of	  
science,	  such	  as	  Duhamel,	  Whewell	  and	  Mach.	  As	  argued	  by	  Koskela	  et	  
al.	   (2014),	   analysis	  proceeds	   through	   regressive	   inferences	   (but	  also	  
through	  decomposition	  and	  transformation),	  whereas	  synthesis,	  being	  
an	   inverse	  of	  analysis,	  proceeds	  through	  deduction	  and	  composition.	  
Peirce	  7	  did	  not	  relate	  abduction	  to	  the	  method	  of	  analysis.	  Intriguingly,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  Hintikka	  (2007,	  p.	  55)	  advises	  not	  to	  use	  the	  word	  induction	  
in	  the	  case	  of	  hypothesis	  testing:	  “[...]	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  it	  is	  instructive	  to	  call	  such	  
reasoning	   inductive,	   but	   this	   is	   a	   merely	   terminological	   matter”.	   	   Indeed,	   if	   the	  
meaning	   of	   the	   term	   induction	   is	   changed	   in	   the	   way	   Peirce	   does,	   the	   question	  
emerges	  how	  should	  the	  types	  of	  reasoning	  traditionally	  referred	  to	  as	  induction	  be	  
called.	  	  
7	  Actually	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  whether	  he	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  method	  of	  analysis	  in	  the	  first	  
place.	  In	  one	  instance,	  he	  wrote	  about	  analysis	  and	  synthesis	  as	  used	  in	  science:	  ”This	  
method	  of	  procedure	  is	  that	  Analytic	  Method	  to	  which	  modern	  physics	  owes	  all	  its	  
triumphs.”	  (Feibleman	  1969).	  However,	   from	  the	  context	   it	  emerges	   that	  he	  is	  not	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the	  method	  of	   analysis	  has	  been	  proposed	  also	  as	  a	  model	  of	  design	  
since	  Aristotle	  (Koskela	  et	  al.	  2014).	  
	  
Now,	  analysis	  would	  seem	  to	  serve	  the	  same	  function	  as	  abduction—
proceeding	  from	  effects	  to	  causes—but	  the	  question	  arises	  whether	  we	  
should	   equate	   all	   regressive	   inferences 8 	  with	   abductive	   inferences,	  
especially	  in	  the	  case	  that	  a	  regressive	  inference	  is	  not	  providing	  a	  new	  
idea.	  Note	   that	   as	   Peirce’s	   viewpoint	   is	   the	   syllogism,	   he	   is	   typically	  
discussing	   one	   inference,	   whereas	   in	   analysis	   it	   is	   customary	   to	  
acknowledge	   a	   chain	   of	   regressive	   inferences	   (for	   example,	   in	  
Aristotle’s	   account	   in	   Nicomachean	   Ethics),	   some	   of	   which	   may	   be	  
habitual,	   some	   selective	   and	   some	   creative.	   This	   boils	   down	   to	   the	  
question	   whether	   abduction	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   type	   of	  
inference	  (that	  is,	  regressive	  inference	  as	  in	  the	  method	  of	  analysis)	  or	  
a	  property	  of	  an	  inference	  (that	  is,	  any	  inference	  producing	  a	  new	  idea).	  
Our	  view	   is	   that	   the	  distinguishing	   characteristic	  of	   abduction	   is	   the	  
generation	  of	  new	  ideas9.	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  will	  be	  possible	  to	  enrich	  the	  
conceptualisation	  of	  design	  with	  a	  new	  distinction.	  However,	  as	  evident	  
from	  the	  presentation	  on	  prior	  views	  on	  abduction	  especially	   	   in	   the	  
design	  domain,	   the	   term	  abduction	   is	   sometimes	  understood	   to	  also	  
cover	   regressive	   inferences	   that	   do	   not	   yield	   novelty 10 .	   This	  
terminological	   issue	   cannot	   be	   solved	   in	   this	   presentation;	   for	  
communicative	  purposes,	  we	  use	  the	  noun	  “abduction”	  as	  it	  is	  generally	  
understood	   in	   the	   Peircean	   sense,	   to	   denote	   a	   regressive	   inference	  
producing	  a	  new	  idea,	  while	  the	  adjective	  “abductive”	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
discussing	  the	  method	  of	  analysis	  from	  geometry	  but	  differential	  calculus	  (also	  called	  
analysis).	   Even	   more	   strangely,	   he	   compares	   analysis,	   in	   this	   same	   sense	   of	  
differential	  calculus,	  to	  Hegel’s	  method	  of	  analysis	  and	  synthesis	  (Feibleman	  1969).	  
These	  failures	  to	  discuss	  the	  method	  of	  analysis,	  when	  it	  would	  have	  been	  apt	  and	  
deserved,	  would	  be	  understandable	  if	  he	  was	  not	  aware	  of	  the	  method	  of	  analysis.	  	  
8	  Peckhaus	  (2002)	  characterises	  regressive	  analysis	  in	  terms	  that	  could	  be	  used	  for	  
abduction	  as	  well:	  ”…regressive	  analysis	  is	  not	  completely	  logically	  determined,	  but	  
has	  elements	  of	  contingency,	  creativity	  and	  intuition”.	  
9	  Thus,	  we	  tend	  to	  agree	  with	  Pietarinen	  (2014):	  ”Another	  way	  of	  putting	  a	  related	  
point	  across	  is	  to	  observe	  that,	  taking	  retroduction	  only	  as	  a	  converse	  of	  deduction,	  
or	   simply	   as	   reasoning	   from	  effects	   to	  causes,	   or	   from	  the	  major	   premiss	  and	   the	  
conclusion	  to	  the	  minor	  premiss,	  is	  a	  limiting	  view	  of	  retroduction.” 
10	  For	  example,	  abduction-­‐‑1	  as	  defined	  by	  Dorst	  (2011).	  
	  
	   19	  
4   Towards  defining  abduction  in  design  
4.1   How  should  we  define  abduction  in  design?  
	  
Why	  to	  define	  and	  clarify	  abduction	  in	  design?	  While	  a	  major	  part	  of	  
designing	   is	   based	   on	   habitual	   solutions	   and	   generally	   available	  
knowledge,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  need	  for	  novelty,	  new	  ideas,	  through	  which	  
better	  design	  outcomes	  can	  be	  targeted.	  The	  existing	  theories	  of	  design	  
do	  not	  provide	  a	   systematic	   and	  detailed	  account	  on	  how	  new	   ideas	  
emerge	   in	   the	   design	   process.	   Fundamental	   understanding	   on	   this	  
crucial	   part	   of	   design	   has	   thus	   been	   lacking.	   Here,	   we	   aim	   at	   a	  
descriptive	  account	  of	  abduction	  in	  design.	  Often,	  prescriptive	  methods	  
evolve	  based	  on	  descriptive	  theories	  (Kroll	  2013),	  and	  thus	  it	  may	  be	  
possible,	   as	   a	   next	   step,	   to	   start	   developing	   a	   method	   providing	   a	  
prescription	  for	  innovative	  design.	  
	  
In	  the	  following,	  a	  framework	  for	  conceptualising	  abduction	  in	  design	  
is	  presented.	  It	  is	  based	  on	  two	  main	  starting	  points	  discussed	  in	  the	  
preceding	  sections:	  (1)	  abduction	  is	  about	  introducing	  new	  ideas	  into	  
the	  situation11;	  (2)	  abduction	  is	  a	  property	  of	  an	  inference	  besides	  an	  
inference	   type	  as	   such.	  The	   first	   feature	   is	  of	  course	  directly	   coming	  
from	   Peirce.	   Regarding	   the	   second,	   the	   common	   interpretation	   of	  
Peirce	   is	   that	   it	   is	   an	   inference	   type.	   However,	   through	   accepting	  
abduction	  (or	  abduction-­‐‑like	  inference)	  happening	  by	  a	  mixture	  with	  
induction	   (in	   the	   case	   of	   analogy)	   or	   deduction	   (in	   the	   case	   of	  
theorematic	  reasoning),	  he	  de	  facto	  gave	  support	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  a	  
property	  of	  an	  inference.	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  second	  starting	  point	  
are	  summarized	  in	  section	  4.1.3.	  
	  
We	   recognise	   the	   following	   important	   dimensions	   of	   abduction	   in	  
design:	   triggering	   factor,	   position	   in	   the	   process,	   nature	   of	   the	  
abductive	   inference,	   outcome	   of	   the	   abductive	   inference,	   and	  
psychological	   character	   of	   abduction.	   In	   the	   following,	   these	   are	  
presented	   in	   more	   detail	   and	   also	   in	   relation	   to	   understanding	   of	  
abduction	   in	   scientific	   research.	   Based	   on	   these	   considerations,	   we	  
then	  present	  the	  most	  common	  types	  of	  abduction	  in	  design.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Here	  we	   follow	   the	   intepretation	  of	  Suwa	  et	  al.	   (2000),	  according	   to	  which	   it	   is	  
situated	  invention	  (interpreted	  here	  as	  situational	  novelty)	  that	  occurs	  in	  design,	  in	  
contrast	   to	  historical	   	   invention	   (first	   time	   in	  history)	  and	  psychological	   invention	  
(first	  time	  for	  the	  person	  in	  question),	  concepts	  defined	  by	  Boden	  (1996).	  Note	  that	  
in	   science,	  historical	   inventions	  are	   targeted;	  nevertheless,	   these	  will	   emerge	  only	  
through	  psychological	  invention.	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4.1.1   Triggering  factor:  abductive  problem  
	  
Taking	   lead	   from	   Velázquez-Quesada et al. (2013),	   we	   propose	   that	  
abduction	  is	  typically	  triggered	  by	  an	  abductive	  problem.	  In	  science,	  the	  
search	   for	   fertile	   problems	   and	   their	   formulations	   often	   start	   the	  
process.	   A	   surprising	   observation	   (Peirce)	   or	   an	   anomaly	   (Kuhn)	  
provide	   a	   basis	   for	   such	   a	   problem.	   In	   design,	   we	   define	   abductive	  
problem	   as	   one	   that	   the	   designer	   is	   not	   capable	   of	   solving	   using	  
habitual	   or	   (generally)	   known	   solutions.	   This	   notion	   of	   abductive	  
problem	  is	  relative,	  depending	  on	  the	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  of	  the	  
designer	  or	  design	  team	  in	  question.	  An	  abductive	  problem	  does	  not	  
necessarily	  lead	  to	  abduction;	  for	  example,	  if	  a	  solution	  can	  be	  found	  
directly,	   in	   a	   non-­‐‑abductive	   way	   from	   literature	   or	   from	   more	  
experienced	   colleagues12 .	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   abduction	   may	   occur	  
without	  a	  preceding	  abductive	  problem	  (this	  will	  be	  discussed	  below).	  
	  
It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  an	  abductive	  problem	  may	  be	  deliberately	  created	  
through	  stretch	  targets	  (Thompson	  &	  al.	  1997):	  create	  a	  new	  product	  
that	   is,	   say,	   10%	   better	   in	   performance	   than	   the	   best	   current	  
corresponding	  products.	  
4.1.2   Position  in  the  process:  anywhere  
	  
In	   typical	   formulations	   of	   abduction	   in	   science,	   a	   surprising	  
observation	   motivates	   and	   initiates	   the	   inquiry	   process.	   Thus,	  
abduction	  is	  positioned	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  process.	  A	  design	  process	  is	  
often	  complex	  and	  covers	  a	  multitude	  of	  different	  tasks.	  A	  priori,	  that	  
an	  abductive	  problem	  may	  emerge	  in	  any	  part	  of	  the	  design	  process	  can	  
be	  expected13.	  
4.1.3   Abductive  inference:  property  of  the  inference,  not  just  a  type  
	  
In	   science,	   the	  main	   type	   of	   abduction	   is	   the	   inference	   of	   the	   cause	  
and/or	   rule	   from	   effect.	   This	   represents	   regressive	   inference,	  
reasoning	   backwards.	   Reasoning	   backwards	   is	   similarly	   a	   common	  
context	   for	   abduction	   in	   design.	   In	   design	   parlance,	   the	   question	   is	  
about	   moving	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   means	   in	   an	   ends-­‐‑means	   chain.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  However,	  of	  course	  information	  acquired	  from	  literature	  or	  colleagues	  may	  also	  
trigger	  a	  creative	  abduction.	  
13	  Dorst’s	  (2006)	  critical	  remarks	  regarding	  the	  customary	  idea	  of	  a	  specific	  design	  
problem	  providing	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  design	  emphasise	  this	  point;	  ”If	  the	  “design	  
problem”	  in	  general	  is	  not	  knowable	  at	  any	  specific	  point	  in	  the	  design	  process;	  and	  if	  
it	  is	  evolving	  in	  the	  design	  process—at	  least	  until	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  design	  concept,	  
and	  possibly	  beyond	  that	  point;	  and	  if	  the	  connotations	  of	  the	  very	  concepts	  that	  are	  
used	  to	  describe	  a	  “design	  problem”	  are	  shifting	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  design	  effort;	  then	  we	  
need	  to	  radically	  reconsider	  our	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “design	  problem.””	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However,	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  other	  types	  of	  inference	  in	  design	  may	  be	  
abductive,	   especially	   transformation	   (of	   the	   problem)	   as	   well	   as	  
decomposition	  (of	  the	  problem	  and	  solution)	  and	  composition	  (of	  the	  
solution).	   Further,	   there	   may	   be	   manipulative	   abduction	   such	   as	  
sketching	   (Magnani	   2004).	   All	   such	   inferences	  may	   be	   abductive	   or	  
non-­‐‑abductive,	  depending	  on	  whether	  they	  create	  a	  new	  idea	  or	  stay	  in	  
the	  domain	  of	  the	  habitual	  and	  known	  (in	  the	  given	  context).	  
4.1.4   Outcome  of  abduction  
	  
The	  outcome	  of	  a	  scientific	  abduction	  is	  a	  hypothetical	  statement	  about	  
nature—“something	  may	  be”.	  The	  other	  criterion	  Peirce	  attaches	  to	  the	  
outcome	  of	   abduction	   is	   “uberty”,	   fertility.	   In	   design,	   the	  outcome	  of	  
abduction	  is	  a	  hypothetical	  solution	  candidate	  (conceptual	  or	  detailed,	  
partial	  or	  total)	  or	  a	  design	  step	  facilitating	  the	  solution.	  Especially	  in	  
the	  latter	  case,	  uberty	  is	  thus	  the	  evaluation	  criterion.	  Uberty	  can	  also	  
be	  related	  to	  the	  strategic	  role	  (Paavola	  2004)	  of	  abductive	  inferences	  
in	   the	   design	   process.	   The	   mood	   of	   an	   abductive	   conclusion	   is	  
“investigand”,	  it	  points	  out	  how	  to	  continue	  the	  (tentative)	  process	  of	  
finding	  a	  solution	  (Ma	  and	  Pietarinen	  in	  press.).	  
	  
The	   result	  of	   design	   abduction	   is	  hypothetical	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	  
novel	  and	  it	  is	  not	  yet	  certain	  whether	  the	  move	  leads	  to	  a	  successful	  
design.	  Thus	   the	  hypothesis	   is	  not	  about	  validity	  of	   a	  natural	   law	  or	  
theory,	  but	  rather	  the	  utility	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  abduction	  as	  a	  part	  
of	  the	  design	  solution	  or	  for	  the	  design	  process.	  
	  
Additional	   criteria	   can	  be	   set	   to	  design	  abduction,	  depending	  on	   the	  
situation.	  Thus,	  the	  outcome	  of	  design	  abduction	  may	  be	  abstract	  and	  
general	  or	  concrete	  and	  particular.	  That	  the	  thing	  abduced	  is	  possible,	  
doable,	  is	  an	  important	  criterion	  especially	  in	  embodiment	  design.	  But	  
in	   other	   cases,	   the	   uberty	   of	   the	   outcome,	   its	   ability	   to	   propel	   the	  
process	  forward	  and	  to	  inspire	  further	  steps,	  may	  accentuate.	  
4.1.5   Cognitive/psychological  character  
	  
Peirce	  connects	  abduction	  to	  a	  psychological	  process,	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  
what	  Poincaré	  has	  suggested	  for	  creativity.	  Incubation	  of	  the	  problem,	  
the	  solution	  emerging	  in	  a	  flash	  (CP	  5.181,	  1903),	  and	  the	  subjectively	  
felt	   certainty	   connected	   to	   the	   outcome,	   are	   the	   hallmarks	   of	   this	  
description.	   Although	   such	   a	   process	   seems	   to	   imply	   an	   abductive	  
inference,	   it	   is	  not	   clear	  whether	  abduction	  always	  emerges	   through	  
such	  a	  process.	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4.2   Types  of  abductive  inference  in  design  
4.2.1   Abductive  regressive  inference  
	  
This	  is	  the	  original	  type	  of	  inference	  named	  by	  Peirce	  as	  abduction	  in	  
science:	   regressive	   (backwards)	   inference	   from	   effects	   to	   a	  
(hypothetical)	  cause.	  In	  design,	  the	  concept	  of	  regressive	  inference	  is	  
similarly	  time	  honoured;	  already	  Aristotle	  (n.d.)	  described	  deliberation	  
in	  the	  following	  way:	  	  
	  
They	  assume	  the	  end	  and	  consider	  how	  and	  by	  what	  means	  it	  is	  to	  be	  
attained;	   and	   if	   it	   seems	   to	   be	   produced	   by	   several	   means	   they	  
consider	  by	  which	   it	   is	  most	  easily	  and	  best	  produced,	  while	   if	   it	   is	  
achieved	  by	  one	  only	  they	  consider	  how	  it	  will	  be	  achieved	  by	  this	  and	  
by	  what	  means	  this	  will	  be	  achieved,	  till	  they	  come	  to	  the	  first	  cause,	  
which	  in	  the	  order	  of	  discovery	  is	  last.	  
 
It	  has	  been	  customary	  to	  call	  this	  reasoning	  chain	  the	  means-­‐‑ends	  chain	  
(Hughes	   2009).	   Usually,	   neither	   inferences	   nor	   ends	   or	   means	   are	  
characterised	   in	   any	   more	   detailed	   way;	   for	   example,	   regarding	  
creativity.	  	  
	  
However,	   as	   presented	   above,	   under	   influence	   by	   Peirce,	   design	  
theorists	  have	   focused	  on	  regressive	   inference	  as	  abduction,	  starting	  
from	  March	  (1976),	  with	  follow-­‐‑up	  especially	  by	  Roozenburg	  (1993),	  
Dorst	  (2011)	  and	  others.	  With	  their	  starting	  point	  in	  Peirce	  (rather	  than	  
the	   traditional	   view	   on	   means-­‐‑ends),	   these	   authors	   depict	   design	  
abduction	  as	  one	  singular	  inference,	  especially	  from	  desired	  behaviour	  
or	   function	   to	   structure.	   Note	   that	   this	   inference	   from	   behaviour	   to	  
structure	   has	   usually	   been	   called	   synthesis	   in	   design	   literature;	   for	  
example,	  by	  Hubka	  and	  Eder	  (1992)	  and	  by	  Gero	  (1999).	  
	  
This	   single-­‐‑inference	   view	   has	   been	   criticized	   by	   Kroll	   and	   Koskela	  
(2016),	  who	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  this	  should	  rather	  be	  a	  two	  inference	  
chain,	  covering	  also	  the	  stage	  of	  conceptual	  solution.	  In	  other	  terms,	  a	  
generalising	   inference	   creates	   the	   conceptual	   solution,	   and	   a	  
particularising	  inference,	  the	  embodied	  solution.	  	  
	  
However,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  in	  design	  a	  wider	  generic	  chain	  
of	   reasoning	   backward	   and	   forward.	   For	   example	   Vermaas	   (2013)	  
defines	  it	  as	  follows:	  (1)	  Goal	  of	  the	  device;	  (2)	  Action	  with	  the	  device;	  
(3)	  Function	  of	  the	  device;	  (4)	  Behaviour	  of	  the	  device;	  (5)	  Structure	  of	  
the	   device.	   Further,	   rarely	   is	   there	   one	   single	   chain	   of	   inferences	   in	  
design	   but	   rather	   both	   the	   functions	   and	   structures	   have	   to	   be	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The	  regressive	  inferences	  in	  design	  show	  a	  multitude	  of	  characteristics;	  
some	  are	  habitual,	  some	  are	  selective	  and	  some	  are	  creative.	  It	  is	  these	  
creative	  regressive	   inferences	  that	  we	  call	  abductive.	   It	  can	  be	  asked	  
whether	   abductive	   regressive	   inferences	   in	   design	   are	   located	   only	  
between	   “behaviour	   and	   structure”,	   as	   implied	   by	   the	   former	  
treatments	  of	  design	  abduction.	  We	  contend	  that	  abductive	  regressive	  
inferences	  may	  occur	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  means-­‐‑ends	  chain	  of	  design.	  
4.2.2   Abductive  composition    
	  
The	  term	  composition	  refers	  here	  to	  a	  spatial	  or	  relational	  (abstract)	  
arrangement	   of	   component	   parts	   of	   a	   system.	   Although	   Peirce’s	  
canonical	  definition	  of	  abduction	  does	  not	  explicitly	  capture	  this	  kind	  
of	  mental	  move,	  he	  discussed	   it	  similarly	   to	  abduction,	  as	  something	  
leading	  to	  a	  new	  idea14	  (Peirce,	  CP	  7.498	  1898):	  	  
	  
Suppose	  I	  have	  long	  been	  puzzling	  over	  some	  problem,	  —	  say	  how	  to	  
construct	  a	  really	  good	  typewriter.	  Now	  there	  are	  several	  ideas	  dimly	  
in	  my	  mind	  from	  time,	  none	  of	  which	  taken	  by	  itself	  has	  any	  particular	  
analogy	  with	  my	  grand	  problem.	  But	  someday	  these	  ideas,	  all	  present	  
in	  consciousness	   together	  but	  yet	  all	  very	  dim	  deep	   in	  the	  depths	  of	  
subconscious	  thought,	  chance	  to	  get	  joined	  together	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  
such	   that	   the	   combination	   does	   present	   a	   close	   analogy	   to	   my	  
difficulty.	   That	   combination	   almost	   instantly	   flashes	   out	   into	  
vividness.	   Now	   it	   cannot	   be	   contiguity;	   for	   the	   combination	   is	  
altogether	   a	   new	   idea.	   It	   never	   occurred	   to	   me	   before;	   and	  
consequently	  cannot	  be	  subject	  to	  any	  acquired	  habit.	  It	  must	  be,	  as	  it	  
appears	  to	  be,	  its	  analogy,	  or	  resemblance	  in	  form,	  to	  the	  nodus	  of	  my	  
problem	  which	  brings	  it	  into	  vividness.	  Now	  what	  can	  that	  be	  but	  pure	  
fundamental	  association	  by	  resemblance?	  	  
	  
That	   Peirce	   did	   not	   explicitly	   consider	   creative	   composition	   as	  
abduction	   (in	  science)	  may	  be	  due	   to	  his	   focus	  especially	  on	  physics	  
where	   causality	   relations	   accentuate	   as	   major	   scientific	   problems.	  
Instead,	   in	   disciplines	   like	   chemistry	   and	   biology,	   finding	   the	  
composition	   of	   an	   entity,	   the	   component	   ingredients	   of	   which	   are	  
known,	  is	  a	  frequently	  encountered	  problem	  type.	  The	  characterisation	  
of	  DNA	  as	  a	  double	  helix	  (Pray	  2008)	  and	  the	  discovery	  by	  von	  Kekulé	  
of	   certain	   organic	   compounds	   being	   closed	   chains,	   rings,	   regarding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Indeed,	  Paavola’s	  (2004)	  characterization	  of	  strategic	  abduction	  approaches	  the	  
understanding	   of	   abduction	   as	   composition:	   ”This	   is	   strategic	   thinking:	   the	  
constraints	  and	  hints	  that	  help	  in	  hypothesis	  finding	  are	  taken	  into	  account.	  And	  the	  
goal	  in	  abductive	  inference	  (at	  least	  in	  most	  cases)	  is	  to	  find	  an	  overall	  pattern	  into	  
which	   all	   evidence	  and	   clues	   fit	  …	  and	   this	   phase	   especially	   requires	   that	   various	  
inferential	   moves	   be	   put	   together	   skillfully	   and	   by	   taking	   various	   clues	   and	  
constraints	  into	  account	  (a	  paradigmatic	  case	  is	  detective	  stories,	  but	  this	  is	  in	  itself	  a	  
very	  general	  model).”	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their	   molecule	   structure	   (Koestler	   1975),	   provide	   examples	   of	  
abductive	  composition.	  	  
	  
Composition	  has	  a	  time	  honoured	  place	  in	  literature	  on	  design	  and	  its	  
antecedents.	   In	   rhetoric,	   arrangement	   was	   the	   second	   of	   the	   five	  
canons,	  referring	  to	  the	  positioning	  of	  topics	  into	  a	  speech.	  This	  linear,	  
one-­‐‑dimensional,	   understanding	   of	   composition	   was	   already	   in	  
Antiquity	  generalised	  into	  two-­‐‑dimensional	  cases	  (painting)	  and	  three-­‐‑
dimensional	   cases	   (sculpture,	   architecture).	   Still	   at	   the	   brink	   of	   the	  
modern	  period,	  the	  last	  great	  scholar	  in	  rhetoric,	  Vico,	  held	  that	  ingegno	  
(invention)	   gives	   things	   “a	   new	   turn	   or	   puts	   them	   into	   proper	  
arrangement	   and	   relationships”	   (Verene	   1981).	   The	   position	   and	  
influence	   of	   rhetoric	   waned,	   but	   the	   idea	   of	   composition	   held	   its	  
position,	   for	   example	   in	   architecture.	   In	   fact,	   the	   seminal	   author	   on	  
design	  abduction,	  March	  (1976),	  named	  the	  outcome	  of	  abduction	   in	  
architectural	  design	  “composition”.	  
	  
A	   vivid	   and	   illustrative	   example	   of	   an	   abductive	   composition	   is	  
provided	  by	  the	  architect	  Aalto,	  who	  describes	  his	  working	  method	  as	  
follows	  (Wilson	  1979):	  
	  
The	   large	  number	  of	   different	  demands	  and	   sub-­‐‑problems	   form	  an	  
obstacle	  that	  is	  difficult	  for	  the	  architectural	  concept	  to	  break	  through.	  
In	  such	  cases	  I	  work	  –	  sometimes	  totally	  on	  instinct	  –	  in	  the	  following	  
manner.	  For	  a	  moment	  I	  forget	  all	  the	  maze	  of	  problems.	  After	  I	  have	  
developed	  a	  feel	  for	  the	  program	  and	  its	  innumerable	  demands	  have	  
been	  engraved	  in	  my	  subconscious,	  I	  begin	  to	  draw	  in	  a	  manner	  rather	  
like	   that	   of	   abstract	   art.	   Led	   only	   by	   my	   instincts	   I	   draw,	   not	  
architectural	   syntheses,	   but	   sometimes	   even	   childish	   composition,	  
and	  via	  this	  route	  I	  eventually	  arrive	  at	  an	  abstract	  basis	  to	  the	  main	  
concept,	  a	  kind	  of	  universal	  substance	  with	  whose	  help	  the	  numerous	  
quarrelling	  sub-­‐‑problems	  can	  be	  brought	  into	  harmony.	  	  
	  
The	   many	   similarities	   of	   this	   description	   to	   Peirce’s	   account	   are	  
noteworthy.	  However,	   there	   is	   a	  new	   element,	  namely	   turning	   to	  an	  
external	  medium,	  sketching,	  as	  support	  to	  composition.	  This	  is	  another	  
type	  of	  abduction	  to	  be	  discussed	  next.	  
	  
To	   sum	   up,	   we	   define	   abductive	   composition	   as	   such	   a	   spatial	   or	  
relational	   (abstract)	   arrangement	   of	   component	   parts	   of	   a	   system,	  
which	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  new	  idea	  in	  the	  context.	  
4.2.3   Manipulative  abduction  
	  
This	   is	  not	  a	   type	  of	   abduction	  discussed	  by	  Peirce.	  Magnani	   (2005)	  
characterises	   manipulative	   abduction:	   “In	   this	   kind	   of	   action-­‐‑based	  
abduction	   the	   suggested	   hypotheses	   are	   inherently	   ambiguous	   until	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articulated	   into	   configurations	   of	   real	   or	   imagined	   entities	   (images,	  
models	   or	   concrete	   apparatus	   and	   instruments).”	   One	   of	   the	   most	  
common	  forms	  of	  manipulative	  abduction	  in	  design	  may	  be	  sketching.	  
According	  to	  Goldschmidt	  (1991),	   “in	  sketching,	   the	  designer	  creates	  
visual	   displays	  which	   help	   induce	   images	   of	   the	   entity	   that	   is	   being	  
designed”.	   Kroll	   et	   al.	   (2001)	   describe	   a	   conceptual	   design	   method	  
called	   “parameter	   analysis”,	   in	   which	   the	   concepts	   and	   ideas	  
(‘parameters’)	  proposed	  while	  designing	  cannot	  be	  evaluated	  directly;	  
rather	   they	   have	   to	   be	   implemented	   as	   hardware	   representations	  
(‘configurations’)	   first.	   The	   configurations	   themselves	   are	   only	  
temporal	  and	  mostly	  serve	  to	  facilitate	  an	  evaluation.	  	  
	  
In	  his	  book	  “The	  reflective	  practitioner”,	  Schön	  has	  many	  examples	  of	  
this	  type	  of	  design	  operation.	  He	  describes	  an	  academic	  supervisor	  in	  
architecture	  (Schön	  1993,	  95):	  
	  
Quist	  makes	  his	  moves	   in	   a	   language	  of	   designing	  which	   combines	  
drawing	  and	  speaking.	  
	  
Such	  moves	  may	  lead	  to	  abductive	  insights	  (Schön	  1993,	  102):	  
	  
He	   discovers	   in	   the	   situation’s	   back–talk	   a	   whole	   new	   idea	   which	  
generates	  a	  system	  of	  implications	  for	  further	  moves.	  
	  
The	  outcome	  may	  also	  be	  another	  type	  of	  abduction,	   to	  be	  discussed	  
below,	  namely	  reframing	  (Schön	  1993,	  166):	  	  
	  
But	  their	  on-­‐‑the-­‐‑spot	  experiments,	  conducted	  in	  the	  virtual	  worlds	  of	  
sketch-­‐‑pad	  or	  storytelling,	  also	  function	  as	  transforming	  moves	  and	  
exploratory	   probes.	   Hypothesis	   testing	   has	   the	   limited	   function	   of	  
enabling	  them	  to	  achieve	  satisfactory	  moves	  or	  to	  surface	  phenomena	  
which	  cause	  them	  to	  reframe	  the	  situation.	  
4.2.4   Abductive  transformation  
	  
Peirce	   (1907)	   discusses	   this	   type	   of	   inference	   in	   connection	   to	  
Desargues'	  theorem	  in	  geometry.	  In	  this	  particular	  problem,	  the	  two-­‐‑
dimensional	  case	  is	  best	  proven	  by	  seeing	  it	  as	  a	  projection	  of	  the	  three-­‐‑
dimensional	   case.	   For	   explaining	   this	   move,	   Peirce	   introduces	  
theorematic	  or	  theôric	  reasoning,	  which	  is	  deductive	  and	  undisputable	  
(in	   contrast	   to	   the	   Peircean	   abduction	   that	   is	   non-­‐‑deductive	   and	  
hypothetical),	  but	  otherwise	  similar	  to	  abduction:	  “…theôric	  reasoning.	  
It	  is	  very	  plainly	  allied	  to	  retroduction,	  …”.	  The	  core	  of	  theôric	  reasoning	  
is	   “in	   the	   transformation	  of	   the	   problem	   –	  or	   its	   statement	   –	   due	   to	  
viewing	  it	  from	  another	  point	  of	  view”	  (Peirce	  1907).	  Peirce	  translates	  
“theôric”,	   coming	   from	   the	  Greek	  word	   for	   theory,	   as	   “the	   power	   of	  
looking	   at	   facts	   from	   a	   novel	   point	   of	   view”	   (Peirce	   1907).	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Noteworthily,	  Hoffman	  (2010)	  classifies	  theoric	  reasoning	  as	  one	  type	  
of	  abduction.	  
	  
However,	  what	  Peirce	  describes	  has	  been	  a	  well-­‐‑known	  step,	  namely	  
drawing	  of	   auxiliary	   figures,	   towards	  a	   solution	   in	  geometry	  already	  
since	  Antiquity.	  Aristotle’s	  suggestion	  of	  the	  similarity	  of	  deliberation	  
(into	   which	   design	   arguably	   falls)	   and	   geometric	   analysis	   has	   been	  
interpreted	   as	   covering	   also	   such	   transformation	   of	   the	   problem	  
(Koskela	   et	   al.	   2014).	   Unfortunately,	   Aristotle’s	   design	   theory	   was	  
hardly	  followed	  up.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  current	  design	  literature,	  Schön	  (1993)	  seems	  to	  have	  seminally	  
described	   abductive	   transformation	   (although	   not	   connecting	   it	   to	  
abduction	  explicitly):	  	  
	  
When	   he	   finds	   himself	   stuck	   in	   a	   problematic	   situation	   which	   he	  
cannot	  readily	  convert	  to	  a	  manageable	  problem,	  he	  may	  construct	  a	  
new	  way	  of	  setting	  the	  problem—a	  new	  frame	  which,	  in	  what	  I	  shall	  
call	  a	  “frame	  experiment”,	  he	  tries	  to	  impose	  on	  the	  situation.	  
	  
Inspired	   by	   Schön,	   design	   theorists	   have	   adopted	   the	   term	  of	   frame	  
(Dorst	  2011)	  to	  refer	  to	  transformation.	  
	  
An	  abductive	  transformation	  in	  design	  does	  not	  create	  a	  hypothetical	  
solution,	  rather	  it	  creates	  a	  new	  problem	  that	  hypothetically	  is	  easier	  
to	   solve	   than	   the	   original	   one.	   It	   is	   thus	   an	   example	   of	   strategic	  
abduction	  (Paavola	  2004). 
4.2.5   Abductive  decomposition  
 
Decomposition15	  refers	  to	  division	  of	  a	  whole	  into	  constituent	  parts.	  As	  
such,	  this	  type	  of	  mental	  move	  has	  been	  known	  in	  philosophy	  at	  least	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  It	  may	   be	   asked	  whether	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   discuss	   abductive	   composition	   and	  
decomposition	  separately	  when	  they	  logically	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  two	  sides	  of	  one	  coin:	  
the	  former	  starts	  from	  parts	  and	  creates	  a	  whole,	  the	  latter	  starts	  from	  a	  whole	  and	  
creates	  parts.	  Both	  are	  applicable	  to	  the	  design	  problem	  and	  to	  its	  solution,	  and	  they	  
often	   occur	   sequentially.	   A	   problem	   is	   often	   decomposed	   into	   subproblems	   (sub-­‐‑
functions)	   because	   it	   is	   easier	   to	   handle	   smaller	   problems.	   Once	   sub-­‐‑solutions	  
(solutions	  to	  sub-­‐‑functions	  or	  subproblems)	  are	  found,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  composed	  into	  
a	   whole	   solution.	   However,	   decomposition	   can	   also	   be	   applied	   to	   a	   solution	  
(structure),	   if	   we	   need	   to	   allocate	   its	   components	   to	   different	   manufacturers	   or	  
distinguish	  between	  parts	  that	  need	  to	  be	  made	  vs.	  those	  to	  purchase	  off-­‐‑the-­‐‑shelf.	  
Likewise,	  composition	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  functions,	  if	  we	  identify	  sub-­‐‑functions	  
that	  are	   realisable	  as	  a	   single	  entity.	  For	  example,	   if	  we	  need	   to	  convert	  electrical	  
energy	  to	  rotational	  motion	  (realisable	  as	  an	  electric	  motor),	  and	  we	  need	  to	  reduce	  
the	  speed	  of	  rotation	  (a	  gearbox),	  we	  may	  combine	  the	  two	  sub-­‐‑functions	  because	  we	  
recognise	  the	  possibility	  to	  use	  a	  gearmotor	  (a	  combination	  of	  motor	  and	  gearbox).	  
Thus,	   the	  problems	   triggering	  abductive	  composition,	  on	  one	  hand,	  and	  abductive	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since	  Plato,	  for	  whom	  division	  was	  an	  important	  operation	  for	  defining	  
things16.	  However,	  as	  far	  as	  we	  know	  neither	  Peirce	  nor	  later	  abduction	  
scholars	  have	  related	  abductive	  insights	  to	  decomposition.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  domain	  of	  design,	  decomposition	  is	  a	  recognized	  mental	  move,	  
referring	  especially	   to	   the	  decomposition	  of	   functions	  and	  structures	  
(Smith	  and	  Browne	  1993).	  In	  addition,	  there	  is	  the	  important	  step	  of	  
allocation	   of	   functions	   to	   different	   parts	   of	   the	   structure,	   which	   we	  
subsume	  under	  the	  term	  decomposition.	  
	  
Our	   justification	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   abductive	   decomposition	   is	  
empirical.	   Dorst	   and	   Cross	   (2001)	   describe	   an	   experiment	   with	  
experienced	  designers,	  where	  all	  took	  the	  opportunity	  of	  separating	  the	  
functions	  of	  the	  targeted	  artefact,	  a	  litter	  bin	  in	  a	  train,	  into	  two	  parts,	  
realising	  them	  separately	  when	  earlier	  approaches	  had	  ended	  up	  at	  one	  
integral	  artefact.	  All	  designers,	  working	  alone,	  considered	  this	  to	  be	  a	  
creative,	  new	  idea.	  
	  
Suh’s	   (1990)	   method	   of	   axiomatic	   design	   has	   increased	   interest	   in	  
creative	   and	   novel	   decomposing	   by	   pinpointing	   the	   importance	   of	  
independence	  in	  the	  realisation	  of	  functional	  requirements.	  
4.2.6   Abductive  analogical  reasoning  
	  
Analogical	   reasoning	   can	   be	   characterised	   as	   an	   inference	   from	   one	  
particular	   to	   another	   particular.	   Thus	   it	   is	   opposed	   to	   conventional	  
notions	   on	   induction,	   deduction	   and	   abduction,	   where	   at	   least	   one	  
premise	  or	  conclusion	  is	  general17.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  reasoning	  from	  
case	  to	  case	  -­‐‑	  hence	  also	  the	  term	  case-­‐‑based	  reasoning.	  
	  
Analogies	   and	   analogical	   inferences	  have	   been	   considered	   as	   a	   valid	  
way	   of	   reasoning	   since	   Antiquity	   (Bartha	   2013).	   They	   have	   been	  
commonly	   recognised	   as	   important	   elements	   of	   scientific	   discovery	  
(Schickore	   2014).	   For	   Peirce,	   an	   analogical	   inference	   appeared	   as	   a	  
mixture	  of	  abduction	  and	   induction	  (possibly	  with	  some	  elements	  of	  
deduction)	   (McJohn	  1993;	   also	   see	  Peirce	  CP	   5.277,	  1868;	  CP	  2.787,	  
1902).	  Commonsensically,	  the	  abductive	  element	  of	  an	  analogy	  is	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
decomposition,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  different	  and	  various,	  and	  it	  seems	  safe	  to	  treat	  
them	  separately.	  
16	  In	  more	  recent	  times,	  Bergson	  has	  had	  ideas	  aligning	  to	  Plato’s	  method	  of	  collection	  
and	  division	  (Lawlor	  &	  Moulard	  Leonard	  2013).	  
17	  This	  way	  of	  contrasting	  analogy	  to	  other	  well-­‐‑known	  types	  of	  reasoning,	  presented	  
in	  (“Analogy”	  2015),	  deserves	  to	  be	  justified.	  Of	  course,	  the	  very	  purpose	  of	  induction	  
is	  to	  generalize.	  Regarding	  deduction,	  Peirce	  (CP	  2.620,	  1878)	  states:	  “All	  deduction	  
is	  of	  this	  character;	  it	  is	  merely	  the	  application	  of	  general	  rules	  to	  particular	  cases.”	  
And	  regarding	  abduction	  (Peirce	  CP	  7.218,1901):	  “Abduction	  seeks	  theory”.	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recognition	  of	  the	  similarity	  of	  the	  cases,	  whereas	  the	  projection	  from	  
the	  one	  case	  to	  the	  other	  provides	  for	  the	  inductive	  element.	  
	  
In	  the	  recent	  design	  literature,	  analogical	  reasoning	  has	  been	  analysed	  
from	   many	   angles,	   and	   methods	   have	   been	   devised	   for	   supporting	  
“design-­‐‑by-­‐‑analogy”	  (Goel	  1997,	  McAdams	  and	  Wood	  2000).	  The	  whole	  
area	  of	  biomimicry	  (several	  other	  terms,	  like	  biomimetics	  and	  bionics,	  
are	   also	   used	   in	   roughly	   the	   same	   meaning)	   is	   based	   on	   utilising	  
analogies	   from	  the	  biological	  world	   in	  product	  design.	  A	  well-­‐‑known	  
example	   is	   provided	   by	   the	   type	   of	   fabric	   hook	   and	   loop	   fastener	  
colloquially	  known	  as	  Velcro,	  the	  design	  of	  which	  was	  inspired	  by	  burs	  
from	  the	  plant	  burdock.	  
	  
The	  use	  of	  analogies	  in	  design	  takes	  many	  forms,	  not	  yet	  much	  explored	  
in	  the	  scholarly	  literature:	  
•   analogy	  based	  on	  form	  (the	  Velcro	  example)	  
•   visual	  analogy	  (Casakin	  and	  Goldschmidt	  2000)	  
•   analogy	   based	   on	   common	   physical	   principles	   (for	   example,	  
taking	  inspiration	  from	  maple	  seeds	  for	  a	  single-­‐‑wing	  air	  vehicle	  
(Fregene	  and	  Bolden	  2010)	  or	  looking	  at	  a	  pendulum	  as	  a	  spring	  
because	  both	  generate	  a	  restoring	  force	  when	  their	  equilibrium	  
is	  disturbed	  (Kroll	  2013)).	  
	  
As	   a	   general	   concept,	   analogy	   has	   been	   characterised	   as	   transfer	   of	  
information	  from	  a	  source	  situation	  to	  the	  target	  situation	  (Casakin	  and	  
Goldschmidt	   2000).	   Thus,	   it	   seems	   to	   cater	   to	   many	   specific	   design	  
inference	   types	   with	   insights,	   such	   as	   regressive,	   compositional	   or	  
transformational	   inferences.	   Obviously,	   analogies	   in	   design	   may	   be	  
abductive,	   resulting	   in	   new	   ideas,	   or	   non-­‐‑abductive.	   The	   common	  
approach	   of	   using	   precedent	   cases	   known	   to	   the	   designer,	   may	  
generally	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  non-­‐‑abductive	  analogy. 
4.2.7   Abductive  invention  of  requirements  
 
The	   design	   problem,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   constraints	   and	   functional	  
requirements,	  is	  hardly	  ever	  given	  to	  the	  designer	  in	  its	  totality;	  rather,	  
adding	   understanding	   of	   the	   problem	   is	   one	   integral	   part	   of	   design,	  
usually	  called	  need	  analysis	  or	  task	  clarification.	  The	  first	  approaches	  
to	  deal	  with	  this	  issue	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  ancient	  discipline	  of	  
rhetoric,	  which	  emerged	  from	  the	  need	  to	  prepare	  –	   indeed	  design	  –	  
speeches	  for	  defense	  or	  accusation	  at	  a	  court	  of	  law.	  The	  stage	  of	  finding	  
ingredients	   and	   arguments	   (called	   topics)	   for	   the	   speech	  was	   called	  
inventio,	   and	   authorities	   on	   rhetoric,	   such	   as	   Aristotle	   and	   Cicero,	  
created	  guidelines	  for	  this	  activity.	  The	  main	  underlying	  idea	  was	  that	  
it	  is	  easier	  to	  find	  something	  if	  one	  knows	  where	  to	  search,	  and	  thus	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pinpointing	   generic	   places	   (topoi)	   for	   arguments	   emerged	   as	   the	  
popular	  methodological	  approach.	  
	  
As	  far	  as	  it	  is	  known,	  the	  issue	  of	  adding	  understanding	  on	  the	  problem	  
has	  not	  been	  identified	  and	  discussed	  as	  an	  individual	  stage	  in	  science,	  
perhaps	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  scientific	  research	  as	  such	  equates	  
to	   it.	   Thus,	   it	   has	   not	   been	   discussed	   in	   terms	   of	   involved	   inference	  
types,	  neither	  by	  Peirce	  nor	  by	  later	  scholars.	  
	  
In	   the	   early	   design	   literature,	   the	   “analysis-­‐‑synthesis-­‐‑evaluation”	  
model	  of	  design	  contained	  an	  explicit	  stage,	  analysis,	  for	  extending	  the	  
understanding	   of	   the	   problem	   (Braha	   and	   Maimon	   1997).	  	  
Subsequently,	   the	   focus	   has	   shifted	   to	   considering	   analysis	   (in	   this	  
specific	   sense)	   as	   an	   intertwined	   aspect	   of	   the	   design	   effort,	   as	  
expressed	   in	   the	   slogan18 	  “analysis	   by	   synthesis”,	   made	   popular	   by	  
Lawson	  (1980).	  The	  underlying	  idea	  is	  that	  hidden	  requirements	  are	  
found	  through	  the	  attempt	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  rather	  than	  preceding	  
it.	  The	  same	  idea	  is	  also	  forwarded	  through	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  problem	  
space	  and	  the	  solution	  space	  are	  co-­‐‑developed	   in	  design	  (Maher	  and	  
Poon	  1996).	  
	  
The	   capture	   of	   hidden	   requirements	   is	   illuminatingly	   described	   by	  
Suwa	  et	  al.	  (2000):  
 
There	   are	   at	   least	   two	   distinct	   ways	   in	   which	   this	   architect	   invented	  
design	  issues	  or	  requirements.	  One	  way	  is	  to	  retrieve	  explicit	  knowledge	  
or	  past	  cases	  and	  generate	  issues	  or	  requirements	  as	  the	  knowledge	  or	  
the	   cases	   prescribe.	   The	   other	   way	   is	   to	   invent	   design	   issues	   or	  
requirements	  by	  some	  justifications	  or	  reasons	  which	  are	  spontaneously	  
constructed	   at	   the	   moment;	   those	   justifications	   or	   reasons	   are	  
constructed	   on	   the	   fly	   by	   being	  mediated	   by	   a	   tacit	   component	   of	   the	  
designer's	  knowledge.	  
 
It	   is	   the	   latter	  way	   that	   arguably	   is	   abductive.	   But	   how	   is	   abduction	  
triggered?	  Through	  solutions	  attempts	  (Suwa	  et	  al.	  2000).	  Note	  that	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  The	  concept	  seems	  to	  originate	  from	  research	  on	  perception	  in	  the	  1950s	  (Halle	  
and	  Stevens	  1959).	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  ”speech	  perception	  involves	  reconstructing	  the	  
production	   plan”	   (Bever	   and	   Poeppel	   2010),	   where	   speech	   perception	   refers	   to	  
analysis	  and	   (internal)	   reconstruction	  of	   the	  production	  plan	  of	   speech	  equates	   to	  
synthesis.	   This	   mechanism	   has	   been	   argued	   to	   exist	   also	   in	   reading	   and	   visual	  
recognition.	   An	   up-­‐‑to-­‐‑date	   description	   of	   analysis	   by	   synthesis	   is	   provided	   in	  
(Poeppel	  et	  al.	  2008)	  :	  ”In	  particular,	  analysis-­‐‑by-­‐‑synthesis,	  or	  perception	  driven	  by	  
predictive	   coding	   based	   on	   internal	   forward	   models,	   is	   a	   decidedly	   active	   stance	  
towards	  perception	  that	  has	  been	  characterized	  as	  a	  ‘hypothesize-­‐‑and-­‐‑test’	  approach.	  
A	  minimal	   amount	   of	   signal	   triggers	   internal	   guesses	   about	   the	   perceptual	   target	  
representation;	  the	  guesses	  (hypotheses)	  are	  recoded,	  or	  synthesized,	  into	  a	  format	  
that	  permits	  comparison	  with	   the	  input	  signal.”	  This	  understanding	  of	  analysis	  by	  
synthesis	  seems	  to	  be	  applicable	  also	  to	  the	  use	  of	  this	  approach	  in	  design.	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is	  not	  only	   requirements	  relating	   to	   the	  original	  design	  problem	  but	  
also	  conflicts	  between	  different	  design	  elements	  that	  get	  retrieved	  in	  
this	  way:	  
 
The	   architect's	   encounter	   of	   unintended	   visuo-­‐‑spatial	   features	   in	   his	  
sketches	   somehow	   activated	   parts	   of	   the	   tacit	   component	   of	   his	  
knowledge,	  and	  thus	   the	  resulting	   interaction	  between	  the	  parts	  of	   the	  
tacit	   knowledge	   and	   the	   unintended	   visuo-­‐‑spatial	   features	   led	   to	   the	  
construction	  of	  justifications	  or	  reasons	  for	  an	  inventive	  idea.	  
 
Abductive	  invention	  of	  requirements	  leads	  to	  unexpected	  findings,	  and	  
there	   is	   no	   well-­‐‑articulated	   problem	   preceding	   it,	   only	   the	   diffuse	  
understanding	   about	   incompleteness	   of	   the	   requirements	   at	   hand.	  
Research	   relates	   this	   type	  of	   abduction	   to	   sketching	  but	   it	  has	   to	  be	  
noted	  that	  sketching	  also	  operates	  in	  and	  expands	  the	  solution	  space,	  
having	  thus	  a	  wider	  scope. 
4.2.8   Other  forms  of  abduction  in  design  
 
The	   preceding	   discussion	   on	   types	   of	   abduction	   in	   design	   is	   by	   no	  
means	  exhaustive.	  There	  are	  rarer	   types	  of	  abduction	  that	  cannot	  be	  
discussed	  in	  detail	  due	  to	  space	  limitations.	  Two	  examples	  will	  suffice	  
for	  illustration.	  
	  
Abduction	   for	   integrating	   scientific	   theories	   in	   design	   has	   been	  
discussed	   by	   Tomiyama	   et	   al.	   (2003),	   using	   the	   integration	   of	  
knowledge	   on	   cooling	   and	   access	   in	   refrigerator	   design	   as	   an	  
illustrative	  case.	  They	  identify	  it	  as	  second	  order	  existential	  abduction	  
in	   Schurz’	   (2008)	   classification.	   In	   turn,	   the	   1977	   design	   of	   the	  
Gossamer	   Condor,	   the	   first	   human-­‐‑powered	   aircraft	   capable	   of	  
sustained	   flight,	   was	   inspired	   by	   manipulating	   the	   equation	  
representing	   the	   forces	   affecting	   an	   aircraft	   into	   such	   a	   form	   that	  
emphasises	  what	  should	  be	  prioritised	  as	  design	  targets,	  especially	  a	  
long	  wing	  span,	  low	  weight	  and	  low	  speed	  (Kroll	  and	  Farbman,	  2016).	  
In	   the	   mentioned	   Schurz’	   classification,	   this	   arguably	   represents	  
theoretical	  model	  abduction. 
5   Conclusion  
 
By	  focusing	  on	  the	  differences	  between	  science	  and	  design	  as	  well	  as	  
on	  empirical	  knowledge	  of	  different	  phenomena	  comprising	  design,	  we	  
have	   derived	   new	   conceptions	   of	   abduction	   in	   design.	   Similarly	   to	  
seminal	  and	  many	  subsequent	  treatments	  of	  abduction	  in	  science,	  we	  
hold	   that	   an	   abductive	   design	   insight	   leads	   to	   a	   new	   idea,	   still	  
hypothetical,	   by	   means	   of	   often	   subconscious,	   uncontrolled	   mental	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processes	  (implying	  thus	  an	   incubation	  period	  and	  often	  the	   flash	  of	  
insight	  when	  it	  surfaces	  to	  the	  consciousness).	  
	  
However,	  given	  the	  differences	  of	  context,	  abduction	  in	  design	  shows	  
characteristics	  not	  found	  (or	  at	  least	  not	  identified	  clearly	  up	  to	  now)	  
in	   science.	   Design	   abduction	   may	   emerge	   in	   any	   part	   of	   the	   design	  
process	   (not	   just	   in	   the	   beginning	   as	   in	   typical	   reconstructions	   on	  
science).	  Abduction	  can	  occur	  in	  connection	  to	  practically	  all	  inference	  
types	   in	  design	   (rather	   than	   just	   through	  regressive	   inferences	  as	   in	  
typical	  formulations	  of	  science);	  it	  is	  a	  property	  of	  an	  inference	  besides	  
an	  inference	  itself.	  Abduction	  usually	  leads	  to	  an	  idea	  new	  in	  the	  context	  
(rather	  than	  to	  entirely	  new	  ideas	  as	  in	  science).	  The	  main	  criterion	  of	  
an	  abduced	  insight	  in	  design	  is	  its	  utility	  (rather	  than	  showing	  its	  truth	  
as	  in	  typical	  examples	  of	  science).	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  new	  conceptions	  of	  abduction	  for	  the	  
design	  domain?	  For	  the	   first	   time,	   the	  different	  mental	  moves,	  which	  
lead	  to	  new	  ideas	  in	  design,	  have	  been	  at	  least	  initially	  identified	  and	  
described.	   The	   new	   conceptions	   invite	   empirical	   validation	   and	  
verification.	  Based	  on	   this	  description,	  hopefully	  gaining	  validity	  but	  
also	  perhaps	  evolving,	  new	  prescriptions	   for	   creative	  design	  may	  be	  
devised	  in	  the	  future.	  Especially,	  the	  different	  categories	  of	  abduction	  
might	  serve	  as	  places	  (topoi)	  in	  which	  to	  search	  for	  novel	  solution	  ideas	  
when	  facing	  a	  design	  task,	  similar	  to	  existing	  creativity	  techniques	  but	  
at	   a	   higher	   level	   of	   abstraction.	   Empirical	   research	   could	   then	   be	  
applied	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   process	   of	   discovery	  within	   design	  
and	   offer	   new	   insights	   on	   different	   forms	   or	   kinds	   of	   creativity.	  
Generally	  speaking,	  expanded	  understanding	  on	  abduction	  offers	  new	  
means	  and	  models	  to	  discuss	  and	  teach	  various	  phenomena	  in	  design.	  
	  
However,	  we	   also	   humbly	   offer	   an	   unintended	   side	   outcome	   for	   the	  
philosophy	  of	  science.	  The	  rich	  variety	  of	  abductive	  inferences	  found	  in	  
design	  easily	  creates	  the	  suspicion	  that	  Peirce’s	  seminal	  discussion	  on	  
abduction	  in	  science	  has	  been	  interpreted	  in	  too	  schematic	  and	  narrow	  
a	  way,	  failing	  to	  capture	  types	  of	  abduction	  not	  following	  the	  canonical	  
form	  of	   “given	   the	   result,	   find	   the	   rule	   and	   the	   cause”.	   The	   question	  
arises	   whether	   an	   overhaul	   of	   the	   conception	   of	   abduction	   is	   also	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